Spirit and Society

6.

We began the first chapter by comparing the essence of power, wild enthusiasm and the segment devoted to their mutual affective identity. It told us nothing about the fundamental flaw of wild enthusiasm. It even gave us false hope that it was a higher power that would encourage, even force the subject to be brave and to act operatively, powerfully and towards dominance. Its comparison with power and with the subject’s relative experience of the relationship between itself and consciousness-of-power, exaggerated its function, even though its function was technical; it prepared the subject for serious psychomental activity, for real procedural practice, and for fundamental restructurings of the soul. The subject’s various approaches to courage and operational action were synthetic invariants composed of a limited set of values. The approaches helped us to understand, in part and figuratively, why wild enthusiasm is not effective in forcing the subject to operate courageously. It was their core, which we did not see “in action.” But the fact that the approaches were supposed to reinforce the influence of the core and support its function, and did not do so, shows first of all how weak a co-constituent wild enthusiasm is. The limited set of values ​​is not the prime suspect, although its activity comes to the fore.

Now, we will take the opportunity to show why wild enthusiasm is ineffective in itself. We will not expose it in order to break the series of failed psychomental approaches. We need the wild enthusiasm to be exposed for two reasons. First, we will identify and clarify its intrinsic flaw in order to create a structure of evidence that will tell us in advance why complex approaches do not work well, even though complexity itself should be a symbol of structural and affective progress. The basic approaches have shown in practice why wild enthusiasm is ineffective, despite the fact that its relative equality with power has exaggerated and elevated it. It so happens that this revealing mechanism provides us with many useful insights. Therefore, we believe that by exposing the original flaw of the deception, we will also take away the appeal of complex approaches (which enchant us precisely because of their complexity). With this, we overrun the complex approaches and stand before a significant culminating fact. As we indicated before, the procedure of wild enthusiasm will be a means with which the subject will “play” in order to devise complex approaches. But the failure of the procedure of wild enthusiasm as a methodological means will force the subject to connect the its procedure with the system of power (which at this point is one relative procedure mixed with the basic original procedural aspects). The subject will even borrow from complex approaches to achieve the most fruitful inter-procedural (or inter-systemic) connection. He is ready for all sorts of psychic restructurings and combinations just to start acting courageously. After that, he believes that courage will inspire him to develop the operational forms of action.

So, now we will consider wild enthusiasm without connecting it to power. To do this, one circumstance from the last basic approach will help us. That’s the inscenated challenge. The subject imagined a challenge. In the challenge he acts bravely, rules dominantly and shows his superiority on several (or one) occasion connected with the favorable sector of life. The subject has no intention of changing this constellation of the challenge. Perhaps he will instinctively choose another challenge, if he wants to contrast it with the current life situation that is tormenting him and is related to the events and contexts in the challenge. He has no intention of changing this constellation of the challenge. Perhaps he will instinctively choose another challenge, if he wants to contrast it with the current life situation that is tormenting him and is related to the events and contexts in the challenge. But all such premeditations will be half abstract half visuogenic. This constitution of life circumstances is not important to us at the moment. What is important is that the subject becomes passionate by the very fact that he imagines the blurred content of the challenge and connects its events with his being. He sublimates the challenge intentionally: the actions that implement the intention to dominate are absorbed into the intention as such. This moment most strongly urges the subject to become passionate. But a problem immediately arises. The subject does not carry out the intention through actual action, but continues to imagine the challenge passionately. Thus it strengthens the intention that wants to be realized by action. He perceives the intention as a unique chance. But he stagnates as he imagines the content of the challenge he overcomes falsely and cyclically. Passion and intention-as-the-only-chance press upon him. The subject intimately resents at the same time as he feels an immense passion that becomes heavier and heavier because he adds to it the burden of intention. Resentment and excessive passion grow side by side, driven by the stagnation of imagination and intention. Passion and resentment are ambivalent forms of excitement. This affective structure of the soul differs radically from the Freudian pattern of excitement, pleasure, and discontent, only in one aspect of topological dynamics. For Freud, pleasure and discontent are Archimedeanly separated from each other. The decline of excitement helps pleasure to prevail, and its rise strengthens discontent. In the case we are describing, the difference does not consist in the fact that the excitement is divided into intimate resentment and high passion. Resentment is similar to discontent, and pleasure to passion. There is one difference that is insignificant for the perspective we are currently considering. Resentment, unlike discontent, not only symbolizes the emotional state of the subject, but also dynamizes it, turning it into a characteristic feature of behavior. Something similar can be said about passion. The higher the passion, the more obvious it is that pleasure conquers the appearance, even when the subject is at rest and does nothing. If the subject decides to do something, then the intense expressions of pleasure called passion will erupt and drown out his self-manifestations. So far, the couples complement each other. What truly separates the two affective structures of the soul is the topological scheme of intensification. Resentment and passion grow simultaneously, pleasure and dissatisfaction diverge and move away from each other¹.

The subject is wildly enthused by experiencing all the aforementioned shifts in the soul in an atmosphere of suffocating passion and stinging resentment. But it is precisely this state and this atmosphere that the subject longs for and reproduces over and over again. In Freud’s subject, pleasure and discontent intersect at certain moments. Their unnatural synthesis can last for a relatively long period. But he strives at all costs to free himself from this psychic state of affairs. Our subject enjoys the atmosphere of stagnation and the air in the paradise of agonizing passion nourishes his self-love. In this sense, mania is closest to wild enthusiasm, although mania does not have the intellectualistic feature of wild enthusiasm in itself and is based on mindless excitement as such. He does not convert the imagined, that is, the cyclical content of the challenge he overcomes, with whom and where he masters, but wild enthusiasm itself. The imagined thing is only an occasion, a convenient body with relative value, which becomes the pure medium of the wild enthusiasm. Dominance as content of the imagined thing, as an eternally recurring challenge with an eternally (un)known course and end, has a certain value in itself. It throws out from itself like a gullet the impulses that exaggerate and increase the subject’s self-infatuation. Dominance makes self-love infinitely dear to the subject. But despite this, once consciousness has anchored itself in the hybrid representation, attention shifts to the wild enthusiasm, empathizing with the contradictory flow of its psychoenergetic structure. Wild enthusiasm turns into a trompe l’oeil (tromplay), not the representation; not the object but the experience. That is why wild enthusiasm “is such a seductive effect, as creepy as the trompe l’oeil: it is a tactile dizziness that bears witness to the subject’s mad vow to embrace its image and disappear”². All the characteristics of the trompe l’oeil that Baudrillard weaves into poetic ecstasy can be attributed to wild enthusiasm. This transcription shows with greatest accuracy how attractive a specter wild enthusiasm is. It is attractive mostly because it is a psychoenergetic specter. A specter that represents pure narcissistic energies. It is something that is not an object but acts as an object and conquers the subject as if it had a beautiful body. The subject seems to touch wild enthusiasm with his whole soul, to sacrificially surrender his whole soul to it. Indeed, “we are talking about touch, about a tactile hyperpresence of things, as if they could be touched. But this tactile phantasm has nothing in common with our sense of touch: it is a metaphor for the eeriness that overwhelms us as we abolish the space of representation”³. We meant the latter when we said that the subject sacrifices the representation to wild enthusiasm. In order to touch wild enthusiasm with its pseudo-touch, the subject must bizarrely abandon the representation. He never gives up on the representation (or performance if we treat it as interactive self-projection). Its sensory influence smolders in the background and intensifies the bizarre rendezvous of the soul and wild enthusiasm, becoming its strange derivative. The wild enthusiasm and the soul are close. They touch each other in the expanse of eternal depths to encourage the subject to drown in the ocean of endless self-love. This is the weak point of wild enthusiasm, which does not give the subject an advantage, because self-love throws him into a solipsistic circle similar to that of wild enthusiasm, and showers him with related damned riches.

Wild enthusiasm is solipsistic. It forces the subject to close in on himself and turn his back on the world. This expression of cursed “genetic” circumstances cannot be changed by anyone, least of all by the approaches, regardless of which “category” they belong to. Then, why do we bother to list and describe the approaches? Because failures co-constitute victory. More precisely, failures shape the lowest layers of its constitution. “To be complete, one must have everything.” Shouldn’t we be concerned about those who, like the subject, lack self-confidence and consequently lack courage? How will we teach them to move on the right path if we don’t show them what mistakes they should avoid? That’s why we took the risk of publishing the failures before we even started reviewing the productive objects of interest.

Passion infects everything: resentment, imagination, and intention itself. Wild enthusiasm does not leave the subject alone to enclose him in its solipsistic circle. Passion calls the subject into its solipsistic circle and does not give him peace to encourage him to overcome his destructive isolation. Without the element of passion, the narcissistic subject who wants to be master would never have sought a way out of the states of stagnation. Passion is based more on the intention to act courageously, which has distracted the subject from the representation, than on the contents of the challenge that initially attracted the subject’s attention. The subject becomes too passionate because he waits for a moment to fulfill the intention. But this moment does not occur at all because of the solipsistic nature and affectivity of wild enthusiasm. For the subject, wild enthusiasm is a latent desire, a predilection, a pre-desire, an unconscious desire that turns his passion into a passive expectation of an intentional outcome.

One of the main problems is created by the cyclical repetition of successful action in the challenge. We take these psychomental processes with a grain of salt. The subject imagines metonymic or independent events, actions and displays of superiority. But they lie tainted at the bottom of abstract visuogenicity, and turn into purely structured pure ideas. Even the predisposed and self-repeating success cannot destroy the bitter and deep feeling of incompleteness. Actions are representations that succeed each other at different time intervals. “The approach of merging representations structured in this way”⁴ does not satisfy the criteria of expectation. The subject becomes alienated in wild enthusiasm and enjoys its energy flows. But the representational structure of the challenge is an additional obstacle to getting out of the situation. Although the representational structure complements wild enthusiasm, it mostly contributes to the subject’s inability to materialize the intention. The abstract visuogenic structure of the representation solipsizes the subject as much as the affective organization of wild enthusiasm, because both lack a certain degree of order. The expediency of the challenge exhausts all possibilities for a different outcome both in reality and in the mental field. But a greater obstacle to subjective, systemic and procedural progress is that the represented challenge is entirely based on ideational categories that are correlated with the contextualized and visually-organized visuogenic sphere. Both are present in the representation and mixed with each other.

Wild enthusiasm plays a negative role from desiderative perspective: it suppresses conscious desire with its solipsistic nature. Whole wild enthusiasm is woven from desiderative drives. But desire and wishing turn into its own slaves while it hides from the subject’s eyes. It prevents the alternative outcome, the outcome that arises from the desiderative sphere, not from the intentional one. Passion wants to show the intention to consciousness in all its glory. But wild enthusiasm overshadows and travesties the intention, wraps it in the vague urges of desire. It disembodies the intention(s) in the insurmountable territory of the drives related to itself that are as vague as desire contained in itself. Wishing is a drive most accessible to reflection, which reflection tames in advance. Wishing is always a desire of which the subject is aware. It is a desire that lasts consciously. But wild enthusiasm manages to overshadow even this consciousness. It turns desire into a spirit that haunts the subject senselessly whenever he falls into the phantasmagoric realm of its solipsism. Wild enthusiasm unleashes desire on the subject like a hunting dog for fun. More so, wild drives hide the intentional sphere, despite the fact that they are fully marked with the stamp of intentions and represent their needs. In this sense, Wild enthusiasm is modeled on drives. It is a complex drive that suppresses intentions within itself. It disfigures them in its affective fog in order to emphasize the solipsistic supremacy. Wild enthusiasm as a drive with the help of which the subject bizarrely and purely mentally possesses the desired object does not exclude spiritual influences. Desire and wish, however masked and hidden, are value-oriented aspirations and value-oriented influences. The fornicator does not see in the beautiful body an object for sexual exploitation, but an ideal that will enable the highest pleasure. Thus the subject experiences wild enthusiasm, although he is not aware of it, just as he is not aware of how much of an object he has become and how susceptible he is to the influence of its hidden agents. It doesn’t draw its spiritual foundations from drive and desire, from passion and intention, but the solipsistic nature imposes its spiritual foundations on it. The subject is satisfied both with wild enthusiasm and with the representation-object contained in it. The solipsistic exchange of “goods” between wild enthusiasm and the subject is an esoteric ritual that has value and exists only for the participants in the event. The solipsistic nature suffocates the agents of wild enthusiasm in order to subject them to it and depersonalize them. It embeds them imperceptibly into the affective structure of wild enthusiasm in order to absolutely domesticate them, to mystify it more, and to increase its power.

7.

As things stand, the subject cannot find a way out. A ray of hope illuminates his mind. The subject is able to see a possible way out of the situation related to the basic approaches. But he himself is not aware that this basic approach will introduce him to the world of complex approaches. The approach that starts too late to arrive on time will bring the subject to the “big” approaches to merge with them and fertilize, as the subject assesses, the necessary possibility.

Some time ago the subject abandoned the idea of ​​the last basic approach. Some time ago the subject abandoned the idea of ​​the last basic approach. It is good to recall that the basic approach consisted of two procedures. First the subject emphasized the general psycho-affective influence of wild enthusiasm. After that, he tried to separate the operational acts, called actions, from the work of the psycho-affective forms of influence. To this end, he created an immanent representation with limited dispositional proportions.

Instead of sacrificing the challenge to the constructive methodology, namely, to embody the intentions in the actions, and to reconnect the actions in the visually organized plot structure, the subject decided on the opposite. He imagined the content of the challenge in its entirety hybridly, which means chaotically. After that, he transformed the representations into the central moment of a single psychomental disposition. Pure actions and pure intentions have dispersed the representation and distributed it within itself. They have also structured in the simplest possible way the dispositional self-projection. The challenge is not only an indefinite face-like image full of indicative forms, but also represents the indestructible disposition of the subject.

The subject has imagined the challenge in this way consciously, which means that intention in this case played a technical role. But intention becomes a contested factor in the process whenever the subject, at this stage of the development of courageous person, tries to use it as a means of inspiration for action and acquiring courage. This basic diagnostic truth teaches the subject how to recognize what intentional nature he is dealing with and what he can do with the types of intentions at his disposal. Accordingly, the subject no longer seeks to unite the extracted intentions into a single unifying symbolic intention, called sublime intention. This awareness allows him to free himself from ineffective intentional structures, but it does not tell him what he should and can do with potential intentions. But the subject does not appear unprepared. He invokes the integral challenge that he opposes to his own procedural reconstructions. Such moments, from an internal and inspectional point of view, were the embodiment of intentions, embodied intentions and actions whose contexts are sealed codes because the subject avoids the intentions hidden in them, or tendentiously restrains himself from announcing them. Both procedural reconstructions belong to the same representation, to the same challenge constantly realized with one outcome. Therefore, it is easy for the subject to orient himself while discovering and exploiting methodological differences that, in turn, indicate invariant structures of the soul. So, the subject selects only one action from a series of individual and networked actions, empathizes with its form. It attributes to itself the intention that contextualizes the action (along with other life factors) and shapes its form. In other words, the subject unifies the action and the intention in their mutual individual expression, according to the challenge whose causal, coherent, complementary and consistent constituents he impersonalized in order to highlight the challenge itself as an integral operational unit. Maintaining disposition and supremacy was a challenge as great as overcoming antagonists and dangerous circumstances, regardless of whether their motives were openly conquering or undermining. The subject had no clarity about which actions stem from which intentions. Nor was he able to indicate how some intentional actions are solidarized with other intentions and actions.

In addition to the above, we can briefly digress and explain what this means: the subject perceives (or rather introspects) the representation (or the challenge, situation, occasion, event, progressive face-like image) as a total operational unit. The explanation will at the same time justify the subject’s latest initiatives.

The content of the challenge is composed of actions-in-relation. The subject can begin to mentalize and consider them one by one. Dispositional memories are full of superior actions. Each convolutional and lower image that we have considered so far hides a secret that leads the subject to invent new dispositional actions (which include all the categories of masterly self-manifestation: supremacy, superiority, dominance). He unites the reminiscent dispositional actions into a hypnagogic whole, in order to extract from their chaotic co-presence a new dynamic structure of domination. The instructive mechanisms of intuition have trained him well. And yet the right moment had to arise for this. However hopeful it may be, it does not mean that this circumstance will significantly help the subject to cope with the shaping of arbitrary face-like images. We will see.

This is why we are inclined to bring bad news. The subject does not extract several memories, or images containing dispositional actions, in order to compare their differences. He does not arbitrarily combine the operational dynamics inherent in each act or in each separate active complex. The hypnagogic whole should encourage the subject to find in it the smallest common denominator of all actions: the spirit of striving for the goal. Spirit will help the subject to extract a dispositional action. It will be extremely arbitrary and will become the basic tissue of the specific arbitrary image.

The subject sets the action apart. But it remains pure and abstract like all previous actions that do not belong to the concretely expressed reminiscence sphere, despite the fact that it cuts itself off from reminiscent experiences and belongs entirely to arbitrary images. This form of arbitrary action has nothing concrete in itself, except that it presupposes purely its own visual organizations. Therefore, it slows down the progress in shaping, regardless of being the first serious initiative, that localizes the crisis and frames it inductively. The additional basic approach will not fall away as quickly as we think. It brings significant side effects that support the function of the single operational unit. Its potentials will develop on the appropriate occasion.

The above-described way of drawing the individual concrete action from hypnagogic whole will also become a derivative. Whenever the subject remembers how he extracted the action, or extracted several such, related, complementary or coherent (potentially complementary) actions, he will be able to experience them for a longer time, and empathize with them more deeply and intensely. Such psycho-temporal prolongation of psychomental events will help the subject, not to complete the structures of the soul, but to gain greater self-confidence. Accordingly, no matter how many actions the event contains, it is an operational unit that encourages the subject to strive to act courageously. Of course, there are dangers along the way that the subject will anticipate, face, and overplay in due course. The extraction of a single dispositional action that takes place intentionally is an additional basic approach. But the way in which the subject extracts it anticipates the world of complex approaches.

Before we continue to separate, distribute and arrange the announced contexts, we will refer to locomotor attention. Later we will also see why this locomotor property of attention co-constitutes and strengthens the work of complex approaches. This perspective will enter into the logic of descriptive development and illuminate it in its own way.

Now our primary focus remains the challenge as an operational unit. He does not see and experience the challenge, or rather the representation of the challenge, any better than the single, abstract and arbitrary dispositional action. However, the representation offers greater psychologistic possibilities than local action even when it is pure, and that is concrete. A dispositional action has greater power than representation, only when each exciting scene of the representation unfolds to highlight the self-same dispositional action. But even then, action depends on the logistics of representation. Therefore, the subject focuses on the sequence of events as such. He is so absorbed that he does not care whether the representation, that is, the only operational unit, is based on reminiscent experiences or on arbitrary face-like images. Prolonged psychic time solidifies experiences. In contrast, locomotor attention helps the subject discover new models of soul structures. It enables him to bind events, actions, intentions, and motives to the representation. Their association with the sequels and the prequels, in turn, helps the subject to perceive all the successive moments at once. The subject gains insight into all the networks of actions that constitute the plot segments. He does not have to move from the atmosphere of one event to the atmosphere of another. Through the mediation of sequels and prequels, the subject does not dwell on each network individually to unravel its essence and does not consider the actions, intentions and motives individually to extract their contexts. All plot moments become clear in advance in all their causal detail, only if the subject psychomentally ties them to the sequel-prequel line (or whole) as such.

We did not single out and consider this operational mode of the challenge separately, in order to politely remove a class of objective shortcomings from the thematic horizon such as the arbitrary action. The action is trans-hypnagogic. It arises from the visuogenic sphere but does not overcome the state of chaos because it does not organize the visual potentialities. The visuogenic sphere is in principle agent of chaos, because in it the visual and the abstract are completely equalized, despite the fact that the abstract is based on the visual. The subject will apply the same model of introspection, that is the locomotor-attentional introspection, to individual and non-reminiscent dispositional action. He will ascribe abovementioned operational mode to the action that he will single out together with the specific contexts that he has decoded because he investigated the intention. But we have emphasized that such introspection is made difficult, not only because of the excessive localization of activities in action, but also because of its perceptual and participatory form. If the representation is too extensive, it will cause the same problem for the subject, only from the opposite side. This model of introspection based in locomotor attention is an operation that the subject performs on the challenge in genere and its local manifestations such as action, interoperative actions, the manner of cooperation, etc. It is a Procrustean technique, which applies to every internal segment. In contrast to the model, а mode is the experience that the subject acquires for the events contained in the challenge that he examines in an unusual way. It can be said that the model is an external operation, and the mode, an internal one. The first encompasses the general dynamics, the second interprets, regulates and accommodates them. One has a supervisory function, the other a taxonomic one. Attention helps consciousness to gather information from both. This functionality is also reflected in the difference between the technical intention and the essential intentions. Technical intentions designate formal changes, while essential intentions outline crucial solutions. Operations are a consequence of intentions and most often outnumber them. But a convenient intention may arise that will force the subject to operate in accordance with it, in the given circumstances, and even disrupt the planned schedule of actions because of it. For the intention to erupt, to turn into an operation and to materialize in detail, the subject must have a strongly developed self-coordinated reflection, popularly and non-systemically called ingenuity.

The locomotor and attentional insight into representation as a single operational unit, pulled representation out of the sterile state of immanence. It was internally cast aside and could not develop from a vivid perspective. It acquired dynamic characteristics and anticipated its own order because it gathered and incorporated within itself elements that constituted its whole. The elements were nothing more than abstract correlates of existential objects and events. And yet, representation has moved further away from absolute immanence. Previously, it had become relatively independent when it turned into a situation of dominance over the life sector. Now, with this one it has distanced itself even further from the suffocating prison of immanence. Since the representation is identified with face-like images as a whole, its progress also advances the integral position of the face-like images, moving them ever more strongly towards its purposeful form and perfect appearance.

This kind of delving into and introspecting representation can be said to be a half-complex and half-simple approach. We characterize this activity in this way because, on the one hand, the subject treats an integral representation independently of its scope, and, on the other hand, the way in which he observes it, i.e. the locomotor perception through attention, is a relatively simple operation. It does not deal with vivid structures that alternately hide linguistic and visual secrets and show unsolved symbols.

8.

Now we will gradually conquer the expanses of the additional basic approach. What?! First we said that this approach will develop in due time. Then we said that it is always relevant because it strengthens the role of the representation as a single operational unit (as challenge). The hypothetical deepening of the knowledge associated with it does not at all confuse our previous calculations. But happens something unpredictable. Although the last approach opened the subject’s gates to complex forms of access, the subject will be faced with yet another additional fundamental approach. It will occur from the side of wild enthusiasm and its affects, not from the side of the face-like images and theirs procedural and systemic properties (by which we mean material-operational aka extensive-expansional, psycho-affective structures and structures of self-manifestation).

Wild enthusiasm is not as negative as it seems at first glance. Its disposition, which is reflected in the fact that it rules the subject as an object, makes its negative essence repulsively impressive rather than presenting it as a majestic factor and attractive power. Itself, as the core of the affective structure of general narcissism, which is called a procedure only because it is repeated cyclically and its stages are somehow arranged, cannot elevate its structure to a higher level. Nor can the cognitive structure of general narcissism, with its schizogenic whispers and conspiracies, expand and increase the affective power of wild enthusiasm. Wild enthusiasm is a pure affect surrounded and composed of other smaller affects that lies that speaks on behalf of consciousness. General narcissism contains intelligible faces, which direct the subject towards values-in-the-world, in order to inflame his affective states. Viewed integrally, wild enthusiasm doesn’t possess any special predispositions and dispositions, except that it humiliates the subject, because such as it is governs his soul, behavior and actions.

According to the above invariably approximate description, wild enthusiasm is transparent. It is eccentric and at the same time extremely withdrawn. It arises, or rather erupts suddenly, and suddenly constitutes its insane character. After doing so, it forces him to taste all of its states in chaotic order and all of them at the same time. Therefore, it is a original gestalt-affect. This phenomenological manifestation of wild enthusiasm is ideal for establishing an analogy with the way in which consciousness-of-power is born and operates.

We have already mentioned that once it arises, power suddenly takes over the subject. It affects him with a dynamic opposite to the dynamic of wild enthusiasm. But we have not explained how power arises and why its emergence is slow, spontaneous, seductive, and irresistible. This view, or rather, revelation from the future, will not disrupt the narrative order, although it is one of the most important culminations in the acquisition of a narcissistic-dominance habitus. So, the motive of every dispositional action, mood, gesture, thought, intention, action of the subject, etc., before he creates the perfect face-like image, is the subconscious feeling of power. The subject also refers to himself as he experiences this affective phenomenon flowing through him. Self-consciousness, that is, his awareness of his I, penetrates his being along with the sharpest affective barbs to remind him that everything he experiences concerns him exclusively and transforms his being into a presence-of-itself greater and more significant than anything else in the world. The I is a cognitive reference that reinforces and deepens the connection between dispositional affects and self-experience. This is a specific form of self-reflective relationship, where the subject does not compare himself to the surrounding reality and its manifestations, but to the psychomental states that overcome him and to his awareness of the role he plays in meantime. In this pure internal self-reflexive relationship of the subject with himself and his states, I is a subordinate derivative, and power is the unconscious driver of the overall events. The subject is immediately aware of these processes and their meaning. But precisely because of the immediate awareness, he cannot transform power into an entity of prereflection, from where it will more easily emerge as an etygeme. The prereflective state of consciousness is more reliable than the subconscious. When the subject wants to push something out of the subconscious, he can hardly remember what it is. But when he wants to pull the same thing out of prereflection, he lacks a little psychic effort to succeed in doing so. Wild enthusiasm sharpens and distorts this certainty. More precisely, by distorting it, it sharpens it. It sharpens it enough for the subject to become even more aware of it, but at the same time it distorts it just enough so that he cannot remember that power is the center and content of immediate experiences. In this context, the subconsciously present power shapes self-reflection and influences it, but cannot stand out and show its face. I overshadows power, usurps its place, even though it is only its absolute subjective reflection. It is a simple reflection of self-awareness, to which power gives authority and importance, although it manifests and is present subconsciously. Power is hidden, but it affects equally strongly and unassailably. Therefore, the subject not only becomes aware of his I, but he frees his I from the pre-reflexive form in order to present it as the center of all immediate dispositional processes. In light of this, even self-reflection acquires a special value, as it signifies the dispositional process as such.

Self-consciousness is divided into self and I. The self represents the subject’s presence in the world, and I represents the subject’s awareness that he is present in the world as he is. Ontologically, self is the center of self-consciousness. But since it is impersonal in itself and represents the individuality-thrown-into-the-world, in self-consciousness it is seemingly identified with the real world and its dynamic surroundings. I, on the contrary, reflects self, but always refers to itself rather than to the self, despite the fact that I is founded by the self. Accordingly, self-consciousness becomes a self-reflexive category. While the subject is aware of himself, he experiences self as a correlate of the surrounding world, and I as his body that must orient itself in the world and engage with it. Which means that the conscious relationship with oneself hides a self-reflexive thread, which internalizes the relationship between the subject and the world, and turns it into a purely subjective relationship. In this sense, self-consciousness establishes differences within itself, thanks to the self-reflective relationship that the correlates within it foster.

While the subject self-reflexively tastes his dispositional states and acts (if he performs them at all), he is aware that his Self, which centralizes the process within itself, is a false double, of something else hidden in his being, which he cannot reach. All the attempts of the subject, from shaping a face-like images, through the procedural discipline of the soul, to possible systematic operational undertakings, move in the direction of helping self-reflection to extract the true center of influence from its double. Wild enthusiasm is so strong that it constitutes this double by flattering the subject, emphasizing his being, in order to lure him and drown him in its quasi-dispositional, turbulent and stagnant whirlpools. But in all its madness, wild enthusiasm gives unusual signs to the subject. He prophetically sees in its exaggerated manifestations signals that point him to closely guarded secrets. Тhe subject begins to self-reflexively doubt, and wild enthusiasm helps power gain increasingly favorable positions. Thus, power begins to free itself from the subconscious form and to approach consciousness. The subject self-reflexively opens itself to the unknown entity in order to add it to the I, or better yet to merge it with the latter, not knowing that what it merges with the I, will be a more significant other-of-the-same, at least as it transposes. Then they will be absolutely equal. Power must be originally united with I in such a way that the two reflect one-in-the-other in order to recognize themselves as one-for-one.

Self that has come to know itself is called I. Or rather, it is a pronoun for the subject that has come to know himself as a being-with-identity, in opposition to the world and its ambivalent manifestations. It belongs to self-reflection openly. Power is exempt from self-reflection because self-reflection and the subconscious do not coincide specifically but purely associate one another. The moment power becomes part of consciousness, it may or may not establish a relationship with self-reflection. In any case, the subconscious will fall away as the subject becomes aware of the etygematic, or associative presence of power. If power co-constitutes the relationship between the subject’s position in the world and the world that opposes or supports the subject in a certain way, then it turns into a self-reflexive category. But if power is placed in relation to the world purely theoretically, or if its practical forms do not concern the subject and its positioning in the world, then it is a category of consciousness, and does not enter the circle of self-reflection.

However, before this happens, I emerges from the egg of pre-reflection, while at the same time, the subject feels the essential influence of power. With the emergence of I, the self reveals its identity. Then, the subject cannot find any other difference than purely formal between the immediate presence in reality (the self) and the body as a presence-on-oneself with which the subject immediately connects its identity, that is, its center called the I. In this sense, the subject resembles the schizophrenic who does not distinguish his selfhood from external objects, even when he imagines them separately. The latter cannot deal with reality because he treats it as a “paradigm that transcends the selfhood-object relation”⁵. However, there is a subtle difference that reflects insurmountable opposites. The subject equates the correlates of self-conscious self-reflection, but does not enter into their relationship with the world, despite the fact that their beings foreshadow, contain, and anticipate the world and their place in it. By being forms of actual presence in the world, they are implicitly self-reflexive. On the one hand, the schizophrenic represents selfhood. Selfhood, synthesizes all the characteristics of identity. They change and change the selfhood with them, but they do not erase the previously acquired properties and the past properties that are no longer there. The self, i.e. the subject actually present in the world, is associated with the identity aspects he possesses up to the current point in life and with those he still processes. However, the actual presence in the world represents the potentials for growth and change of identity. I takes into account current and future characteristics of identity, and connects them directly with the self, i.e. with the immediate presence in the world. The selfhood and its elements have a relationship with the world, are part of it and arise from it. But the subject appropriates them in order to attribute them to himself. He turns them into a symbol of the body that he experiences as one of the most important elements of his presence, called the presence-on-oneself. He also isolates them from the world in order to admire the world, or for the world to admire him; in order to overcome or oppose the world with their help. There is no need to ask: does he renounce the characteristics of identity by equating and mixing them completely with the world? It’s clear that he is not interested in their dispositional ratio. He reconciles them and does not care that it is necessary and useful for him to separate them.

I and power influence each other synthetically. Their “collision” shines through intermedially. The I is transparent to consciousness, and power influences the subject as deeply as I is transparent. Thus, power strives to free itself from the subconscious, and the I subtly prevents it and as a result becomes as transparent as power is persistent. In order for I and Power to unite, they must first enter into such a conflict. This is a necessary initial phase of their mutual transformation. The lower value overcomes the higher value, until the higher value suddenly overpowers the lower value in the end, so that they become blatantly equal as worthy fighters. After all, power must be anchored in the I. In order to be transformed into an original property and guide of consciousness, power must submit itself to this humiliating transformation, to be elevated through the value to which it is submitted. At the beginning, the role of the I is more substantial because it advances power. Power and I are not paradoxically synthesized through mutual distancing from each other. I seeks to suppress power, and power seeks to subjugate I at all costs. This is a kind of mutual distancing. But such distancing is productive in the way that Deleuze describes and supports: “In fact, it is a positive distancing of elements. In it, two opposites are not identified. Their distance is affirmed as something that connects them in harmony with their differences”⁶. The I identifies with its bearer. Power identifies with everything that the bearer of I unites to his being, symbolically, metaphysically, materially. The two forms of estrangement—the subordination of one and the desire to subjugate the other—create stagnation. This stagnation is due to the fact that differences must be consolidated and manifested in accordance with similarities; they need time and resources (by resources we mean the characteristics of narcissistic domination which is a system of power). This situation is faced and experienced by the subject every time he achieves a certain dispositional goal. He exalts himself instinctively, under the pressure of the joyful outcome and event. The feeling that overwhelms him at that moment embodies the unity of the I and power. The subject identifies dispositional success with the self. If the subject conceptually doubles this immediate self-reflexive reality, it will transform into a immanent, cyclical, and dynamic relation of power and the I. In this experience and gesture, the unity of the I and power is shown frozen, expressively, and symbolically, regardless of whether they are conditionally and convergently distant from each other or are identified in the spirit of domination. While the subject freezes the relationship between the I and power in the empathy with the situation of demonstrated superiority, the first part of the principle of positive distance applies. The I and power are united in immediate experience, as much as they are united transgressively and modified in self-consciousness. The whole joy of the subject, and especially his sublime self-perception, is based on his successful relationship with the world. Therefore, both have a share in self-reflection. However, I is transparent, and power is repressed. The first takes away all the glory of power. If he had a more concrete or detailed insight into the affairs of power, the subject would quickly sober up from the feeling, to consider the situation reasonably within himself and to draw cold-blooded victorious conclusions. With one decisive move he would place power above the I in order to show it its place. But since power cannot be imagined without the I that impregnates it, the subject would have to transcend his intentions and put power through the ritual of humiliation. Thus it will establish the second part of the principle of distancing; it will unite the affective correlates on the basis of the unique possibility of convergence. After that, power and the I will unite in an unquestioning and apodictic way. The subject will be able to use their affective unity as a banner of self-reflection on every occasion in which he can show superiority and in every challenge that brings his immediate presence and the world closer together. He will direct his stern and confident gaze towards the challenge, to encompass the situation while embracing himself in the field of vision. Thus, power and I will merge with self-reflection and encourage him to act with a high awareness of his own possibilities.

It is perfectly clear (as perfectly clear as things can be from a metaphysical perspective) how they will function in unity. They will be equal in value and will represent the subject as an indivisible whole. The unity of the selfhood and the object (read the world) does not offer any goal-directed structure. It doubles in consciousness the visuogenic sphere with all its hypnagogic monstrosities. Even when the subject equalizes the selfhood and identifies it with an object, and not with the whole world, he localizes the principle of hypnagogic and visuogenic representation. When that which is obviously different from the other is presented as something that is completely identical to it, it is as if the subject says that he has separated the meaning from the image, although he has not yet created an image and cannot extract a meaning. The second factor in the comparison concerns the visuogenic sphere. The subject will find himself in a new absurd situation if he claims to have found meaning in the hypnagogic segment composed only of forms that do not associate with anything and can not be connected to anything. This last case indicates hypnagogic potentials.

I and power are extremely identical and extremely different at the same time. They are identical because both refer to the narcissistic-dominance habitus of the subject. They are different because: 1) power represents the objective and subjective qualities of the habitus, and 2) I represents the very being of the subject to which they refer. For example, will is a subjective quality, but in this case it does not belong to the self, but to power. The I is identified and equated exclusively with the subjective presence that is superior in time-space. We distinguish the I from the Ego. I is a pure correlate of self-consciousness. The Ego absorbs and identifies with itself all life manifestations of the subject that pass through his soul and form some kind of sensorimotor and intuitive syntheses as Jung defines it⁷. Whenever the subject thinks of his I, he thinks of it as a pure mental correlate of himself as homogenic whole and of nothing more. It cuts itself off from any concrete identification with individual subjective attributes, although it sometimes equates them with itself through their unity with the whole body. Everything exists to enter into a distant correlation with it, but it does not commit itself to anything. It enters into a distanced relationship with the other, but does not commit itself to anything. The only thing it fully identifies with, due to the aforementioned similarity, is power. The only thing with which it is identified in its entirety, due to the aforementioned similarity, is power. Power and the I are united absolutely in the metonymic sense of the word. Immediate presence appropriates both the subjective and objective qualities of the narcissistic-dominance habitus. Therefore, power and the I are united absolutely, despite the fact that their beings have separate constitutions. Absolute metonymic unity implies that two things are united completely, and in doing so they manage to fit their different systems into the unity. For example, feeble-minded children cannot coordinate power and the I in their being⁸. The I as a substitute value for power is an energy system. Once they have satisfied this system, they cannot channel its realized energies and connect them with power, whose energy system is original and needs to grow, after the first system has flowed into it. These children always satisfy one system, or immediately give up on it and move to the other, in hope that one of them will completely and easily satisfy their criteria for overcoming challenges. The I is an immanent center that suddenly fills their life with essence because it completely encompasses their immediate presence. In this sense, the I is not only a substitute value, but also a value that allows them to satisfy the disturbed boundaries of striving. Power represents the complex, psychic, operational and personal structures of overpowering challenges and antagonistic entities, and overpowering is a progressive aspect of dispositional states. That is why it is an original value, and children have great difficulty dealing with its energy system contained within them. One system is rigid, the other unattainable and seemingly compensated. When foolish children appear to exercise power, they are in fact replacing power with its extremely simplified and absolute personal correlate of who it should be reflected in, in whom it should be rooted, and with whom it should grow.

We have moved away from wild enthusiasm and its strong solipsistic affect, but we have deepened its relationship with the consciousness-of-power. We have separated them according to the dynamics of their emergence and development. When power-consciousness truly arises, it will manifest itself in other ways according to circumstances. Now it is time to return to the additional basic approach related to wild enthusiasm and shed more light on it.

The mystical description of wild enthusiasm convinced us that wild enthusiasm and self-love, or self-infatuation, are closely related. Components of general narcissism and consciousness-of-power are identically connected⁹. All factors in the structure of general narcissism openly call upon the subject to participate boldly in the affairs of power. Their schizogenic proposals, which complemented each other, sought to make the subject aware of power and to awaken the consciousness-of-power. Vainly, but not hopelessly. They aimed at power but hit wild enthusiasm.

The subject adds itself in the same visuogenic style and in the same hypnagogic way to the representation that has a dispositional context. While maintaining psychomental contact with the contents of dominance, the subject, to put it symbolically, re-forms his image, projects himself as a mental double in the soul. He inserts these content into the progressive face-like image¹⁰, attributes it to the image in an extremely overbearing manner, fills it with it, until the image begin to flow and overflow. This narcissistic gesture urgently gives birth to wild enthusiasm or exaggerates it if it is already present and active in the soul. The subject ascribes to himself prepotently the contents of dominance inherent in the “imagined” life sector (which do not necessarily include only existential representations, but also definitions, that is, representations of power and desire as categories). The subject knows that he inserts hybrid contents into the face-like image symbolically, not really, which means in an visually organized manner, so he is tempted to fill this deficiency. Wild enthusiasm absorbs the face-like image together with the contents of domination stuffed into it and subject’s self-projected personality. It represses them within itself to feed itself. It is infamous, stealthy, and quiet as the stomach. It doubles the negative appropriation committed by the subject, increases the deficiency and itself becomes its highest representative. But on the other hand, wild enthusiasm is a juicy psychic energy, because it directly stimulates the subject’s infatuation with himself. Hence, what is absorbed in it acquires a special hedonistic value. Wild enthusiasm is not a deficiency that reinforces the impression of absent abundance, it replaces abundance. Although it is its simulacrum, wild enthusiasm originally imitates the affective properties of the material structure of abundance. In a sexual sense, the phallus is a sexual symbol of deficiency that shines through the fertile structure of the subjects’ narcissistic relations with themselves. But the phallus is an object that responds readily and powerlessly to the absent abundance. It symbolizes lack more than need. It resents by giving physiological responses to abundance not letting it know that it has responded.

This positive property of wild enthusiasm can even be understood as an approach by which it encloses the subject in its hermetic psychoenergetic field. As the subject enters the field of wild enthusiasm, this function of deficiency, which is abundance itself, is transformed into an approach or a method¹¹. Once the subject has entered and continues to hypnotically enjoy the state imposed on him by wild enthusiasm, the approach is standardized and becomes a regular procedure. The world seeks the subject back, but at the same time it is acutely aware that wild enthusiasm has hopelessly conquered him. The subject returns to reality, but each new period spent in the embrace of wild enthusiasm fatally distorts his interests, behaviors, and relationships.

The ontological status of deficiency-as-abundance is opposed to psycho-physiological anxiety in the affective sense. Deficiency-as-abundance has enabled the subject to experience himself as a self-integrated narcissist. It brings him closer to the objects of narcissistic pleasure (with the contents of dominance and with narcissism as such) paradoxically, by sacrificing them to the affective solipsism. Psycho-physiological anxiety, for its part, in a subtle and eerie vitalistic way proves that the phallus is a reactive and inferior object that represents the deficiency that is, the need for compensation. It is a penetrating form of phallic reaction. It is that unpleasant urge that drives the phallus forward, to satisfy its own appetites. This form of anxiety conquers, paralyzes, terrorizes and terrifies the subject, but at the same time forces him to feel an irresistible pre-ejaculatory and pro-ejaculatory pleasure.

At first glance, the psycho-behavioral states of the wildly enthused subject are same as these. But depths are measured and compared at the bottom, not from above and provisionally. While being wildly enthused and wildly enthusing himself, the subject is not deeply paralyzed. His paralysis is latent, half-acted and half-staged. He becomes mysteriously petrified, assumes rigid postures, but enjoys in an inexpressibly subtle way, arbitrarily and freely. The (sexually) disturbed subject also enjoys subtly his stance, but his enjoyment, and especially subtlety, is only pro forma, behind which hides the beastly terror and violence of compulsion. Psycho-physiological anxiety innocently observes the behavior of the sexual needs, but must play the role that they will determine for it in order to carry out the compulsion and make the subject act. They attack the subject fiercely through anxiety and encourage him to be periodically brave, but in a one-dimensional direction, sexually, not in the complex operational and behavioral sense of the word. The subject enjoys its automatic ferocity, but at the same time he is in severe agony.

Compensation will work if the bountiful influx of abundance washes away the deficiency. The phallus tries to reach the ontological level of wild enthusiasm. He wants deficiency to appropriate the affect of real abundance. It imposes on the unsatisfied physiological need the pleasure based on the thought of sexual acts that inflame the instincts for reproduction. To eradicate the deficiency at all costs, the phallus forces the physiological need to anticipate its own pleasure vividly in order to feel that it is achieving it. But psycho-physiological anxiety spoils the phallus’s calculations, because it spoils the simulated pleasure, makes it bitter. Bitterness helps pleasure and enjoyment to become unbearable because of the pleasantness. Bitterness intensifies the unbearable pleasantness of pleasure and enjoyment. The mental projection that transforms pleasure into anticipation limits pleasure, further embitters enjoyment, and makes outbursts of pleasure even more unbearable. Тhe subject imagines the future act purely while anticipating it hyperhedonically. The pure mental projection that transforms pleasure into a energetic anticipation of the real act limits pleasure, further embitters enjoyment, and makes outbursts of pleasure even more unbearable. Meanwhile, the sexualized subject is faced with yet another affective enigma. He knows that he is anticipating real pleasure and that this pleasure is strong and and originates from pure impulse. But the fact that anticipation and pure imagination of the concrete act double the pleasure is surprising. They create a layered hyperhedonic simulacrum, or a phantom and “two-component” pleasure if you like. It exerts a stronger influence than real pleasure in its own way only because the limited access to real pleasure and the insufficient alternatives shape its unbearable irresistibility. All these actions are convergent because they serve one purpose: to remove the deficiency from the “life” of the phallus. They are transformed into elements and currents of the sublime expectation of an outcome. Sublime expectation is embodied energetically in the contemplation of sexual acts. It characterizes the meta-real pleasure of desired sexual relations.

These differences between the subject of wild enthusiasm and the phallic subject help us to understand why deficiency of abundance that is common to deficiency-as-abundance and to deficiency as the fatum of abundance differs from the latter two. The two ontological statuses, that of wild enthusiasm and that of the phallus, possess, or are symbols of, the deficiency that presupposes abundance in one way or another. Modulation in this-or-that-way fills in advance the gap between deficiency and abundance. It allows the sexual deficiency of abundance to unite with the affective field of wild enthusiasm, to grow with it. Immediately after that, they will terrorize the passionate subject with combined forces. It is enough to recall Aquinas’s concept of concupiscentia, where wild enthusiasm is identified with evil lust, only in this case, the element of evil is excluded from the affective and psychoenergetic relationship. Pursuit of power requires the subject to intellectually invest himself in the overall narcissistic-dominance challenge. If it is a question of lust, then it is not an ordinary passion, but a passion grounded in the love of the subject for his own cogito. Therefore, lust is transformed into wild enthusiasm. All in all, on the surface, ontological statuses contradict the natural relationship between deficiency and abundance. The natural relationship presupposes a certain distance. Deficiency must be greater than abundance. The distance depends on their quantitative ratios. For example, someone has an abundance of something, but still lacks the same thing. However, the solipsistic dialectic of wild enthusiasm and sexual drive (and urge) convincingly refutes this empirical prejudice.

9.

Wild enthusiasm turns deficiency into abundance. Itself is transformed into an abundance that is inherent in the deficiency. It replaces the abundant object just as I suppresses power. But it is stingy enough not to distort the false image of a saint. It allows the subject to taste delusionally all the charms of the object of interest that he desires. The object of interest seduces the subject because the subject wants to be seduced and does everything to be seduced. This manic self-compulsion is transformed into a mania, into an objective affect that gains power over him. Wild enthusiasm certainly does not encourage the subject to act, but it does encourage him to experience the object of interest strongly; to enjoy it while empathizing with the idea that in some way he is establishing an expropriatory relationship with it. Especially the second transpositional phenomenon of affectivity inculcates in the subject such persistence in trying to gain courage that he overturns all mental possibilities and tries all variations of mental structure just to materialize the expropriative idea. Wild enthusiasm overwhelms and overplays the subject. While closing himself off from the world in the affective field of wild enthusiasm, while totalizing its solipsism and totalizing himself in it, in the name of the desired value, wild enthusiasm instills in him an absurd belief. It forces him to believe that his very empathy for the idea of appropriating value is an transcendent act of appropriation, akin to the disturbing feeling of pleasantness. Wild enthusiasm rivets the subject’s attention to courage and action through the idea of ​​appropriation and at the same time distracts the subject from the actual starting efforts.

Courage is not an element of action but its functional correlate. Without courage, the subject cannot act, and without action, courage is only a brazen thought, a short-lived and shameful (or ridiculous) outburst, an irrational experience. The subject does not change his interest in their values. This means that the more he becomes aware of the traps of the wild enthusiasm, the more resolutely he will modify his mental structures in order to find the most appropriate approach. No matter how much he has come to recognize the dirty game of wild enthusiasm, he knows that it is the spontaneous product of his unbridled bias. Above all, wild enthusiasm is a necessary all-embracing moment that intensifies desire, passion, and intention, although it absorbs them, disfigures them, and from their amalgam makes its substance. Thus, our brain sometimes rushes, making a mistake that masks productive potentials. It connects two different parts of two different words, or replaces their first letters that create melodic correlates because they are composed of consonants. This usual damaged reflex of the brain reveals its primordial panoptic ambitions. Wild enthusiasm is the product of several fierce drives and convergent urges. It synthesizes them and transforms them into a single predominant affect. Closest thing to it in terms of the affective impression it leaves is passion. It completes what the brain begins to produce instinctively and without awareness of its innate tendency.

Wild enthusiasm has exhausted itself as an additional basic approach. The subject cannot free himself from it, but he also cannot help thinking about courageous action. He gradually leans towards the latter, although wild enthusiasm holds him tightly in its arms. The objective situation drives the subject towards new transitional approach. It is not surprising. Since every new approach is, as we have said, a kind of step towards victory, wild enthusiasm helps the subject to eradicate weakness from a long-term perspective. Eventually, the subject will have to free himself from wild enthusiasm in due time, or tame and cultivate it by uniting it with the affects that are related to it but are more subject to the disciplined self-consciousness. Whether there are higher affects related to wild enthusiasm and whether it can unite with them and thus be tamed will be examined later. However, there is one truth that neutralizes all predictions and assessments. If the subject hopes that wild enthusiasm will tame itself, that it will cease to hold him in slavery, and that at a certain moment it will become his object, he is deceiving himself. The affective tyranny of wild enthusiasm cannot be changed and is incorruptible. Its solipsism greedily devours, violently digests, and slowly dissolves all the interests of the subject, until he is horrified by the fact that his failure and the fruitless infatuation are one and the same. Together they turn into an endless urge that stagnates and cannot get out of its shell, while it thinks it flows endlessly into the glorious infinity.

The approaches are replaced progressively and convolutionally, and prepare the subject to gradually free himself from weakness. Otherwise, wild enthusiasm will become an ever greater correlate of weakness and a lesser driver of methodological persistence. It produces the subject’s retreating weakness to the same extent as the urge for courageous action. The subject must take advantage of the knowledge of the primordial Archimedean status of wild enthusiasm, in order to position himself correctly both in terms of approaches and in terms of weakness. This antinomic role of wild enthusiasm in the subject’s psychomental life, which influences the quality of his behavior and nourishes inferiority, is the main and perhaps the only positional act that explains thoroughly why and how the subject becomes its object. Its object, not an object for it. If the subject is an object for wild enthusiasm, it treats the subject somehow, but this does not mean that it has appropriated him and turned him into its object. If the subject is object of wild enthusiasm, then wild enthusiasm directly gains power over him.

We are moving away from the main goal: the description of the transitional basic approach. Therefore, we will go back. Such a discrepancy is not accidental and plays a very important role in the analytical-descriptive process. Previous reviews led us to the connection between wild enthusiasm and weakness. If we had not cut through wild enthusiasm and peered into its “womb”, we would never have learned that wild enthusiasm is not only related to weakness, but is one of its aspects, and even appropriates its paralytic function. Weakness is an abstract syndrome. It encapsulates, equivocates and generalizes within itself all the reasons that can threaten normal action, regardless of whether it is associated with courage or other problems. If something disrupts the spontaneous manifestations of the subject, then it is an element of weakness. The only original indicator that roughly reflects weakness is the distorted spontaneity of both mechanical and deliberate movements. This indicator is original because it is not reduced to the complex of pathological meanings that characterize impaired action and distorted spontaneity, but contains exclusively the general and individual impressions associated with the appearance of weakness. Since the sequence of ideas has forced us to conditionally equate wild enthusiasm and weakness, we will also need to show their fundamental difference. We will benefit from this in many ways. Weakness itself and wild enthusiasm as a “modifier” of weakness hinder action, the measure of which is non-spontaneous movement and mechanical impressions.

The transitional basic approach is based on the concrete action and the intention embodied in it. This initial step brings the subject back to the essence of operating for dominance and, in particular, to the intentionalized operational action that we presented earlier. That, and this is expected due to the previous diagnoses, will not help the subject to encourage and act. Action as an element of approach will continue to be dysfunctional from the perspective of its methodological role in the soul. It will not be dysfunctional, in the sense of inarticulate mechanical and inappropriate contextual movements. Because of possible conceptual misunderstandings, it is good and necessary to know the differences between weakness and wild enthusiasm. But their distinction will not help us to understand why action is impaired and what are the various causes by which it degenerates. The action will be a mental entity, an aspect of visual representations that works perfectly. The subject will imagine it in order to transform it into a perfect symbol of aspirations towards power. On this side of the spectrum, things could not be better. In parallel, the in-depth classification of wild enthusiasm and weakness should help the subject understand how he will undermine the solipsistic power of wild enthusiasm by means of approaches after discovering the classification difference. At the very least, we expect the transitional basic approach to help the subject to undermine paralytic affects through difference. For this reason, we move in roundabout ways. Instead of talking about approach first and then difference, we will show difference, then consider approach. This asymmetrical order of descriptions and connections will help us to present the picture of things non-schematically, as it manifests itself in the subject’s life, with all its contradictions, curves, and seemingly messy relationships.

To explain the effect of weakness as an abstract symptom, we will need to interpret several metaphorical depictions from Frank Herbert’s science fiction book Dune. Before that, we will present several one thesis about universal use of metaphor related to our idea of the abstract form of weakness.

A metaphor is a word that belongs to a certain class of practical activities and properties, but we use it to describe actions and qualities of another class. The possibility of a word from one class to replace a word from another class, without artificially distorting the idea, is provided by the isotopic nature of words that replace each other and belong to opposite classes. The shared genetic similarity of the words is not visible in the grammatical structures that constitute them, neither when they are replaced by each other, nor when each word is placed in the example of its class. Two different verb forms can represent the same practical logic, even though the mechanical movements are seemingly different. The meaning of the actions can coincide, bringing the different movements closer together and connecting them on a genetic level.

Our representational metaphor will not include different verb forms that have the same context in two different practical spheres. What our metaphor will include will also exchange its “goods” with each other. Such metaphorical actants that will help us describe weakness symbolically will be: a1) the representation as something that symbolizes the other and a2) the interpretation as a symbol that we extract from the symbolizing, from that-that-symbolizes-the-other. Whichever of these two objects of interest we put in the place of the other, its meanings will become completely analogous to the replaced representation, that why 1 and 2 belong to a, that is, to the center of the analogy. And whichever of the objects of interest initiates the process of analogization, it can always be reduced to a symbolic means of the object of interest that produced it. By doing this, we complicate the metaphor and elevate it to a higher level. We abolish and upgrade its grammatical monism. It becomes a qualitative structure of the analogical exchange between textual and pictorial contents. Interpretation that turns the symbolizing upside down represents textual contents, and symbolic representation, obviously, represents pictorial contents. While interpretation reveals the meaning of the representation and inverts it, it itself becomes a symbol of what it interprets. The inverted is nothing other than an integral interpretation that has taken on the analogical form of what it interprets. Interpretation transforms the form of what symbolizes the other by revealing the symbolism of the other. The revealed symbolism offers new content. The new content is not entirely identical to the content of the representation. The representation shows something. Interpretation and its content represent the symbolism of the other by rethinking the thing depicted in the other. They try to present the same context with a new content – ​​that is, the thing-in-the-other. They strive to referentially retain the old content, the content of what symbolizes the other, by introducing a new form that will reflect the same context in a different way. The different way is a form that seeks to save both the content of the symbol and to depict the self-identical context from a different perspective.

The metaphorical verb also has such a function. It replaces the corresponding member in the sentence, its epitome, but does not distort the meaning of the grammatical structure. We see this here too: the meaning of interpretation does not abolish the meaning of representation. The text reflects the symbolism of the other, which is at the same time same and different from the representation. The depiction and its vivid content, which symbolizes the other, are absolutely analogous to the textual symbolism of the other. Whichever aspect of reversal we take, it will always reflect the same context, provided that the analogous difference of coherent objects of interest is taken into account. The latter explanation shows us more specifically how the powers of metaphorical operations and the limits of metaphor increase.

Having explained this aspect of symbolic actions, the metaphorical approach to the essence of fear, which is the greatest sign of weakness, will become more acceptable to us. Hesitation and seeking justification for unfaithful behavior are next on the list of top inferior “values”, and are signs of incoming fear. That is why, we will focus on fear. But fear is unthinkable without pain. It is an unconditional adversary that comes from the transpositional exterior and reflects all fantastic dangers. Therefore, a necessary introduction to Herbert’s metaphorical depiction will be pain, its essence and phenomenological dynamics.

Pain transcends the circumstance. Taken by itself, it is a transcendent object that affects the living being by emerging from the field of the objective circumstance. As an affective object, it goes beyond the framework of the circumstance because it is part of the interior of the individual living being. Pain is an object-at-the-circumstance-but-not-in-it because the subjective interior isolates it from the orders and objects in the environment. Pain attacks the most important object in the environment – ​​the bodily self-awareness and forces it to experience its own circumstance in a special way. Pain forces subjectivity to exploit the perspectives of perception and the reality that are offered to it, and to extract consequent meanings from them, in accordance with the degree of the presence of pain and the proximity the pain establishes with the body and the soul. The eye that expects pain unites the psychophysical self-certainty of the subject with the real environment and identifies them because it does not know from where the pain will strike, even though the source of danger is often obvious. This is so because the expectation of pain is different from the blow and the feeling it causes. The expectation of pain is seemingly more frightening than the feeling of pain. The expectation hurts the most. When we talk about pain that is not a consequence of the physical and verbal blow or the blow of phobic panics, we always think of the expectation of pain and its affectivity, which is equated and identified with pain. In the same sense, pain is an object-at-the-circumstance because it is one of the factors of interaction that the subject maintains with the entities in the environment. But until the blow materializes pain, pain is an actual duration that has not occurred and an actual consequence that passes by the subject. It acts as an absolute premonition that carries with it and radiates all the characteristics of what will happen. It is an omnipresent transcendent influence, which in its reduced form, embodies, or rather re-adapts the highest manifestation and makes it dependent on its conditions and twisted standards.

Pain is an affect of subjectivity that manifests itself immanently in two ways: causally and cyclically, but merges into the body together with the blow and its strategic determination to attack. It is an object-at-the-circumstance in every sense, because it plays an affective role that connects the external and the internal, creates an expectation in which they merge until they become impersonal. It is not a material element of the environment, nor a bodily factor of the blow and the attack. It is completely absent as a material object that establishes a relationship, and yet the subject fears it, even before he thinks of the blow. It is reflected in advance and symbolically in the antagonistic action of others. Therefore, the way in which it is present and absent is paradoxical and extremely unusual, but not incomprehensible.

While the subject expects it, it is also not an object that affects him from a great distance, nor an object that affects him from a small distance. It is a priori transpositional. It is an active immanence that approaches as a reduced highest manifestation, or attacks as a concrete affect that thickens, embitters life, and shatters the dignity of the subject. Pain is in an internal way infinitely distant from the being of the victim in which it manifests itself, in order to appear as an absolute element of the circumstance and return to the deepest regions of the subjective interior. Thus, pain makes a full circle from the interior to the exterior and back, and is active in a certain way, regardless of whether it is actual or expected. It circles and at the same time encompasses the subjective interior and the surroundings in their entirety. Pain merges with the circumstance even though it does not belong to it, because it manifests itself contradictory and directly in the actual life space. If pain is concretized, it will only confirm its topological predispositions. If it remains an affect-that-is-expected, the subject will not cease to identify its reduced terror with the concrete injuries it will inflict on him. The proof that it is present through its absence is its immaterial immediacy, which the subject experiences as he feels his own exaggerated psychic states. Only the feelings are immediately fused with the subjective interiority. Pain is transposed into reality as a transcendent object that attacks and approaches the subject from every pore of the circumstance and the living space.

The semi-spontaneous, semi-mechanical spasms of the body and the constricted soul stimulate the transcendent influence of pain. Not only do they unconsciously summon it, but they are so ignorant of what they are doing out of fear that they exaggerate its reduced terror and thereby increase and sharpen it. Accordingly, pain is in the circumstance immediately, but it is not in it materially. More so, the subject knows that pain is present in the circumstance (which obviously concerns the subject) because its reduced and concrete transcendental action is what is immediately present. Its immanent thrust disperses everywhere and continues to disperse as long as it lasts wave-like in sub-intervals, that is, pseudo-causally. It is a phenomenon-without-appearance, which does not have to originate from a concrete object. Transcendence itself can be the cause of pain, for example, unconscious phobia. The first is a pure transcendence that encourages the pure transcendental influence of the second. In fact, it is difficult to say whether pain is pure transcendence, when the subject identifies it with everything around him and first of all with his own unfavorable situation. We believe that pain stands out as a transcendental object. It places itself above everything with which is associated, even above everything with which is identified, because the subject is singularly preoccupied with it.

While it is reduced, that is, while the subject expects it, pain is factually absent. It cannot be made present by any non-factual intermediary, nor is there any symbolism that can justify its absence. And yet, in spite of this, reduced pain manifests itself through its own absence. Expectation is not just a painful premonition, but a surge of pathological fears that erode being. Fear itself is a mirror in which the subject sees the deficiencies that he will acquire, or inherit, if he does not overpower pain. Considering the latter, pain is an absent presence, that is, a transcendent abundance that grows. It reflects an affect, fear, which directly confronts the subject with deficiency. From this fundamental ontological perspective, reduced pain is a mode of presence that is paradoxical in the same way as deficiency that somehow manifests itself as abundance. It is abundance that mediates deficiency. Once it becomes concrete, the reduced pain is transformed into an abundance that affects the subject more and more convincingly, even though it has no visible being and therefore reminds of deficiency. After that, it grows as a consequence of the concrete pain that is increasing and consequently is becoming more acute.

Pain is bizarrely apodictic. It is a closed whole that spreads concentrically and centrifugally, no matter how much the subject looks around because he does not know where it will attack him. Therefore, it categorically escapes from the circumstance, even when the subject does not want to admit it. It absolutely correlates with the subjective interior. The subject confirms this without question. After being overwhelmed by the pain, he focuses entirely on his being, gathers in himself, tightens, that is, self-consolidates, all bathed in agony. So, the concrete pain discards all topological excesses and shows where it truly belongs (depending on how strong it is). If the concrete pain is not too great, it solidifies itself with the reduced pain. But in that case, the subject stops being afraid of both and changes his attitude towards the environment: from an obviousness full of absolutely certain outcomes, he transforms it into a relieving homely atmosphere.

Reduced pain cannot save its own mode of presence called being-at. After the subject realizes that he has had a good time, he compares the reduced and the concrete pain. He concludes that they are the same and equally harmless, despite the fact that previously he was waiting in panic fear for the reduced pain to become concrete and knock him to the ground. The subject behaves even more contemptuously towards the concrete pain and its intensities. He feels superior because he has managed to avoid its terrible and gloomy threats. Light-hearted and even traitorous to himself and his honesty, he forgets what the opposite outcome would have been. The mode of being-at would manifest itself most fiercely and most obviously if the subject exposed himself to terrible pain. His reactions, no matter how much he suppresses them and whether he has successfully suppressed them, would reveal pain as a presence that is not absent at all, although it is not seen as such and as an absence that is absolutely present in the reactions of the subject. The painful sight would say everything about the pain and its ultimate presence and influence.

An even more shameful situation than the moment when the subject completely surrenders to pain is the expectation that the reduced pain will turn into a concrete pain that will grow until it takes out his soul. He singles out the piece of circumstance that threatens to cause him pain. This piece may be part of the external world and contain an object that causes pain. Even though the object will be corporeal, it can cause the subject transcendental pain. For example, the habitus of the object or some of its properties or characteristics can trigger an unconscious phobia in him; a phobia that connects old traumas with new symbols. The segment of the object that terrorizes the subject transcendently is not a material source of pain. On the other hand, the piece of circumstance can be part of the subjective interiority, be a psychic representation that the subject connects with the given reality in which he exists. Then the representation itself becomes a transcendent object, a circumstance in itself, which will make the subject’s encounter with reality hurt.

Regardless of what the piece of circumstance will be and what terrifying objects it will contain, the subject takes it as a model of terror and transforms it symbolically. The piece of circumstance threatens to disrupt the subject’s behavior because it will negatively affect his position in the existing toposphere. The dynamic content of the piece of circumstance is transformed into a real phenomenon that operates around him and moves towards him to hurt him. Meanwhile, the reduced pain becomes an instrument in the hands of the terrifying circumstance. It is so close to the subject that he feels the terrible breath of the sadistic intensity that will be embodied in the concrete pain. Thus, the reduced pain is gradually induced. Heidegger coined a special notion of being-which-is-already-at¹². This concept coincides ideally with our idea of ​​the dynamic location of the reduced pain, its movements, intentions and the outcomes of its action. The concept is equally valid for the frightening phenomenon aka piece of circumstance, that surrounds the subject. If the frightening circumstance is a being-which-is-already-with the subject, then so is the inducing pain. Both threaten him within the same ontological mode and both are implementing the dehumanizing operation. Analogously, the pain that will be induced is equally frightening. It is the center of the circumstance that seeks to destroy his dignity.

The subject is riveted with his whole being to the piece of circumstance. He connects the frightening circumstance with the reality in which he finds himself, and symbolically transforms the two into one sinister entity. He distorts ordinary reality because he sees it in the context of primordial pathological impressions. The subject fabricates the state of unconsciousness. It seems that he deliberately acts to provoke that state before the pain has time to seize him. He makes such forced psychomental gestures when the antagonistic entities are closest to him and have just passed from frightening to real action. But the subject is confronted with the terrible truth before he can automate the simulation and turn it into a compulsion. In those moments he witnesses the most terrifying possible being-which-is-already-at him. Whenever a character in a movie faces an experience like this, the scene ends, and he is left waiting to receive hell with wide eyes reflecting absolute horror.

For Heidegger, being-which-is-already-at is not an object, or a material relation that can be concretely transformed. He does not mean an existence that reflects a transcendental idea with a demiurge form. Heidegger takes into account the intuitive conception and intuitive experience of what he unconsciously strives to conceive and whose concrete essence he can discover here and now. He does not produce essence because he does not have the instruments for it, but because he allows the self-imposed and superiorly clear essence to take over his being, which opens itself to it completely and turns into a here-being. This state overwhelms the epistemological apparatuses and prevents the possibility of essence being transformed into a product. It is a supra-intuitive state. Its pure being is sacred. For it, anthropomorphic ecstasies are a thing of the past. Its pure being is sacred. He does not covet its immanent scope that has great potential. What is so close to his reach and in such pure form leaves a stronger impression from the moment he takes it in his hands to conceive it. Its pure form is only a sign of his unattainable identity and epiphenomenal individuality. If Heidegger grasps the essence, he will abolish the quasi-ecstatic stream of revelation and blur the overabundant clarity that flows from it. Being-which-is-already-at is an absolute characteristic of essence extremely isolated from its own contexts. It is the center of intuitive attempts, but to which no intuition can reach. Despite this, he is madly pleased to have noticed it and to show infinite awareness of its presence. The subject tries to reach a similar state with the help of hasty and improvised simulations, in order to distance himself from pain. But instead of achieving the desired absolute state, he rushes into the opposite state. Instead of falling conditionally, symbolically and falsely dead, he enters the torture chamber of immanent agony.

If the subject “survives”, he will discover the deepest secrets of pain and will capture them forever in the hermetically sealed experience. This last fact will tell him a lot and will lead him to additional conclusions.

The subject feels the pain himself, but that does not mean that it cannot become present for others. Also, it can be present to the subject because he feels it, but not seen by others. One medium builds relations of opposition, the other avoids such relations. Pain always needs two such media: one medium that will frighten and another medium that will be frightened. Frightening does not always manifest itself physically, in the sense that it is not a destructive physical act. Therefore, it causes pain based on premonitions. Since the subject has not tasted physical pain, he assumes what will happen, he is horrified, and the state of horror and humiliation hurts him deeply. Such is emotional pain and has a reduced form. The pain that arises from the knowledge of the inevitable consequences is due to physical frights. In that case, the subject knows exactly what awaits him. Therefore, he trembles at the thought of not heeding the ultimatum of the one who threatens him. The fact that he became an accidental victim of such a monstrous situation hurts him most.

Pain is permanently symbolic. Both the one who feels it and the one who sees it cannot see its being, because it has no material expression, except for the expressions made by those who are touched by it. It is not absent because it has no material expression, but because no one feels it at a given moment in time. If it begins to be present affectively through the media that symbolize it, the fact that it will not have any expression in the exterior will not shake its presence. Not having its own material expression is its deficiency. But it itself becomes a desired deficiency whenever it is absent affectively, regardless of symbolic manifestations. The fact that its being does not have its own material expression reflects a lack. But the lack acquires significance, to the extent that it is significant for the medium that terrorizes to shake the medium that is terrorized and to show that it has shaken it seriously. Pain is a deficiency in and of itself, in terms of the expressions that are attributed to its pure being. But once it appears, pain indicates that it is potentially self-abundant and that the abundance will grow as the reduced pain deepens and as the concrete pain gets sharp. Consequently, presence and absence have to do with its abundance, not with its deficiencies. The deficiencies are ephemeral and relate to arbitrary symbolic objects, that is, to opposing media. The more abundant the pain, the more present it is, regardless of how it manifests itself, into which expressions it is channeled and which of them it modifies, and in which impressions it becomes the dominant factor. It is not absent because it lacks expressions that will bear witness to it, but it is absent because its affective influence is small. The expressions will come of themselves, if the pain is concretized and intensifies transcendently. Its being is pure because it is composed of pure transcendence. The greater its strength, the stronger the pain. Its impact is reflected more in the feelings it evokes than in the appearance that reflects the feelings evoked.

Pain is a being-at-the-circumstance. It gradually turns into a being-that-is-already-at-the-subject: it distances itself from the general circumstance, connects and solidifies with a certain intentional toposphere that is directed towards the subject. Together they crave towards it. Pain is the tool of the piece torn from the general circumstance, but it gives the impression of working independently, although it does everything in coordination with the piece. All the while, pain is an absence present in affective sense and a presence absent in material-aesthetic sense. It can be reflected as a generalized being-at only if it is the center of the affective interaction between the frightening medium and the frightened medium. The integral appearance and integral phenomenon of the relationship between the injured object and the object that injures is brought to the surface by the ontological mode. The role of the mode narrows in direct proportion to the expansion of its grammatical form. From being-at it is upgraded to being-which-is-already-at. The object that injures, with physical and symbolic frightening, does not reflect the pain in itself. By itself, it strongly refers to it. But, without the visual co-component that complements the expressed affect, that is, without the object that is injured by the other object, pain cannot manifest itself as a generalized being-at. The object that injures will direct the subject’s attention to the object that is being injured. This one reveals his own condition expressed physically and mentally, and through it symbolically and associatively shows how strong the pain is. The situation identifies pain as an expression of agitated psychic energy, which fully represents the subjective interior. Psychic energy is a part of the object that has its own consciousness and its own body. The way its movements change appearance shows how strongly the object is connected to its own subjectivity and its interior. Pain reveals the subjective interior as an intimate structure on which the entire ethos of the object depends.

First, pain was a priori transposed both in the subjective interior and in the prevailing circumstance. After that, it moved into the subjective interior. The last description only supplemented the same situation from another perspective. Now the subject transposes pain again, this time into material interaction. In doing so, he approximates its a priori transposition. He focuses on the pure material interaction, so he equates the expression of pain with it and its visual content. Whichever segment he sees, every other segment is automatically and associatively or literally, i.e. equi-existentially connected to it. Even if he cannot see the material interaction of the objects in its entirety, because he himself is an object affected and attacked by the object that hurts, the subject can imagine transceptively the affective and visual whole of the interaction. Transception means that the subject imagines the part of the interaction that he cannot see with his own eyes and complements it artificially with the visible part. He wants to know the affective appearance of pain in its entirety. Therefore, when the victim-object is his body, he imagines what he can anticipate and joins the visible to what he imagines. In fact, what he imagines is a copy of the current reality for which it is not difficult to invent an analogy based on the pattern of photographic memory.

Insight into pain transcends the material interaction that has now become a unique circumstance. Pain embraces the circumstance and transforms it into itself. If the subject cannot follow the sight to the end, it means that the pain has reached its maximum and has transcended the interactive circumstance without a trace. The subject identifies the writhing or screaming personal expressions with the agitated psychic energy. He attributes their unity to the material interaction and its circumstance. If pain were not to manifest itself in this way, it would forever remain closed in the subjective interior. By “closed” we also mean the cases when it is outlined as sublimely as possible on the objective expressions of appearance. If nothing else, in order not to be constantly tormented by the sadistic sight, the subject must discover compulsive islands, on which he will find peace from the excessively disturbing dynamics and activities. Pain follows such actions, because it lies at the basis even of the segments that do not depict its material-aesthetic core.

The all-encompassing perspective of material interaction transformed into circumstance limits the subject’s possibilities of seeing pain only as an affective element of subjectivity. For example, he tries to limit the perceptual horizons to the relationship between subjectivity and pain. But because of the inert manifestation of extensive experience or because the comprehensive perspective is too intrusive, he does not see pain as a passive immanent point that spreads throughout the entire expression of suffering. In his current outlook, pain is not identified with subjectivity, with the psychic energies and their bodily expressions that are under its influence, nor is it isolated in the frightening environment. It is a living everywhere transposed core that separates and simultaneously unites the interior and the exterior, the circumstance and the subjective interior. Pain is a general being-at only if it is reflected absolutely in material interaction: as the suffering of the tortured and the pleasure that the torturer derives from the sight of his own crime. The expression of inflicting injury and the expression of the harm suffered co-constitute the circumstance with the primordial objects and their tragic connections, because they are an aesthetic part of the material process. Even the tragic interaction itself is a dramatic whole if the sadist enjoys it as an artistic gesture.

Although pain is a general being-at which is embodied in material interaction, it does so conditionally. Although pain is a general being-at which is embodied in material interaction, it does so conditionally. The complex of interactive events radiates pain in three ways depending on the perspective of the frightened or tormented object, from the perspective of the tormentor or frightening object and from the perspective of the witness and his threshold of tolerance towards the tense sadistic atmosphere. Thus, in material interaction, apart from the objects, the expression of their interaction and the expression of the consequences of the interaction, the spirit of interaction also enters, which is purely phenomenal. It is based on material events, but at the same time it depends on the psychomental constitution of the subjective factors in the process. The interaction and the expressions are implied in the material process. But the approach of the subjective factors is something that comes out and depends on the psychomental constitution, which in this case is classically monadic. Accordingly, the general being-at of pain is also divided into three segments. They contradict each other. More precisely, the third, distant and passive interactor, is open to establishing an approximate relationship with one of the subjective factors that have entered into direct interaction. It all depends on his inclinations and the relationships he cultivates towards them.

Pain and the spirit of interaction arise through the material relation of objects that are opposed in a particular way. Pain would be embodied as a flawless general being-at in the complex of sadomasochistic interactions if the spirit of interaction was impregnated in the interactions. Before we discovered the spirit of interaction, pain was an independent entity that rose above all the phenomena to which it was affectively co-present. Its being-at was not only general, but it did not break down into the elements of the circumstance, although they were its vivid medium. After the spirit of interaction appeared on the scene, pain began to depend not on the dynamic appearance of the material relation, but on the impressions that the objects leave on the receptive reflections that somehow participate in it. Each subjective factor treats in its own way the common and causal scenographic segments.

10.

We have examined the phenomenology of pain. Now we continue with the question: what is the person like, according to Herbert, who does not practice to be able to cope with pain? Why do we say that he is weak because he is too afraid? How does the subject recognize himself in such a psychotype?

Herbert identifies fear with the inability of man to endure pain. For him, every man who cannot bear pain is subject to decay. Even Dostoevsky could not answer the question of whether he would be able to preserve his faith if exposed to great physical suffering¹³. If he does not face and endure pain, man turns into an animal even without knowing it. His consciousness must be alert, and his body ready in order to be able to deal with pain and to turn the thought of pain into a means of producing psychophysical endurance. Pain forces man to act instinctively, and instinctive action further suppresses his initiatives for dominance. Instinctive action does not only imply resourcefulness and cunning, but resourcefulness grounded in the urgent need to get out of the zone of risky tension and establish a peaceful relationship at all costs. The first two characteristics are domineering, but the last is a consequence of impulsive cowardice and severely damages the dignity, reputation, and personality of the subject. Summa sumarum, man becomes an animal because pain prevents man from acting dominantly.

Herbert embodies this understanding of the fear of pain in two scenes. The first scene contains the way the main character mentally struggles with the fear of pain. In the second scene, Herbert exposes the main character to a deadly test. The main character meets the challenge and shows that he is not an animal and that he has mastery potentials and predispositions. Meanwhile, Herbert inserts another scene into the plot that shows allegorically what inner abominations a man faces who thinks about pain, about the fear of pain and about poor nervous endurance. This man is weak, he increases the population of the animal race, and he struggles with microscopic challenges. Microscopic challenges do not elevate his “evolutionary” status, just because they are challenges that man struggles with. They collapse in the big picture, and with them man, unable to prepare for dominance by enduring pain. The more pain gains power over his soul and forces it to fear it, the more a man sees himself as a victim of his weakened nerves. In this respect, self-conscious self-reflection is a double-edged sword. It can play a crucial role if the subject manages to articulate the relationship between the image of mastery and the rational approach to challenges. If he disrupts their balance, he automatically predisposes himself to instinctive action.

The more the hypothetical pain gains power over his soul and forces it to fear it, the more a man sees himself as a victim of his weakened nerves. More precisely, weakened nerves are in themselves an inexhaustible source of pain and fear of it. Tense circumstances irritate the nerves, inflict highly affective reduced pain, and distort the dominance self-expressions if the subject is even capable of showing them. Herbert transforms dangerous nerves into huge and bloodthirsty worms. They ravage the bare desert expanses. They suddenly and ominously emerge to the surface after appearing next to their victim, and then devour it. They have extremely sensitive receptor organs. They sense the movement of a man walking in the desert, and so they approach him, pounce on him, lean over him, and eat him. A weak man experiences his shaken nerves in a similar way. If he is an extreme sociopath, he turns the very meeting with strangers into a huge negative potential waiting to crash him mercilessly. The tense circumstances are result of his thoughtless movements that awaken and excite the nerves. He thinks that his apparent weakness will encourage others to deceive, harm, and injure him. He must control himself in order to articulate the circumstances, just as a wanderer in the desert must tread properly so as not to attract the ever hungry and overstarved worms. Herbert exaggerates the metaphorical essence of the statement “you’re getting on my nerves” and turns nerves into beasts, but not beasts that will destroy the other, but beasts that will destroy their owner because he surrenders too much to their power. Trampling on nerves and trampling on the wastelands of the desert have the same consequence, although in the first case the nerves are directly and physically affected, while in the second case the movement in space mediates the activity of the entities that symbolize their sadistic essence and urges. The verb “trample” turns into a single metaphorical factor that does not replace anything, but fills the gap that arises from the partial incompatibility of the two modifications. In his case, this neuropathological association has a socio-political context, while we use it as an example from individual psychology. It doesn’t have to exist as such in the sentence “you get on my nerves” and burdens it, it is even redundant because it can simply be said – “you annoy me”. Trampling on the surface of the desert is logical and consistent with the empirical circumstance. It does not become metaphorical until it is brought into connection with the consequence it causes. In a transitional sense, trampling is a metaphorical factor whenever the representation in which it is included symbolizes “trampling on nerves as such” and brings its meaning to life.

Apparently, this is one of the several neuropathological conceptions of pain and the fear of pain, although it has a fantastic connotation. This would be so if we had not connected fear with the coherent values ​​of the concept of dispositional position. The subject is reduced to an animal if he surrenders to pain. Animals are often unpredictable, they can be extremely timid or extremely aggressive. And a subject with thin nerves can be flexibly fickle or stoically fickle. This is the first appearance of a dispositional setting that represents the lowest layers of dominance. But animals cannot develop predispositions of dominance and strategically secure the future of their power. Because of the pain, which in one way or another hinders a person, he cannot practically elevate himself. He is too duplicitous, just like the animal. The meaning of the basic neuropathological syndrome depends on this perspective of potential dispositions. Dispositional perspectivism transforms the empirical nature of the syndrome, consecrates it and makes it sacred. This point forces us to acknowledge that the fear of pain, and the fear of the fear of pain, is an abstract syndrome, and not just objective content of real dynamics. The metaphor revealed the abstract inter-structure that connects the two representations of weakness: the empirical and the fantastic. Both perspectives embody self-identical weakness. What they have in common is its abstract nature.

The syndrome is abstract because of the dispositional perspectivism and it is neuropsychological because it contains stereotypical phenomena. But regardless of how we consider or treat it, it has an encapsulating quality, which is also inherent in wild enthusiasm. Weakness hinders the subject’s aspirations towards and efforts for dominance. Therefore, it seems unnecessary to compare wild enthusiasm and weakness. To prove why delusion affects in a different paralytic way than weakness is a waste of time and thematic space. The difference is obvious to the astute who can make a connection between the stratospheres without hunting for formal inter-referential knots. But we will remind you again that this is not a simple comparison that will reveal the differences. We will need the comparison to show how it can influence the methodologies of the soul. Therefore, at this moment we will move to the announced descriptive level.

Wild enthusiasm was an affective conglomerate composed of various reflective, emotional and intentional moments and factors. Power as the highest principle of the immanent-transcendent other that wants to absorb the subject always follows the object of interest and represents our deepest motive for action. It forces the subject to become unquestionable object of wild enthusiasm; in his relationship with wild enthusiasm to mirror, repeat in a reduced form and renew its own original influence and authority. The subject does not know where his consciousness-of-power as the patron of the object of interest begins and where the authority that bias, passion and infatuation have over him ends. He is unable to locate when and what has a greater influence: his intention to act biasedly or the prepotent motive that forces him to act and is a contextualized drive of acting at all costs. In this chaos, the segments of the purposeful structure of affects of the soul are piled up and affect the subject as a conglomerate. The chaos demonstrates the initial value of Wild Enthusiasm as much as it shows how inferior it is to Vainglory and Obsession, which are based on purposive procedures of the soul, and are terminal values of the latter.

Wild enthusiasm represents all the highest aspirations of the purposive soul structures. It is at the same time the deepest and most superficial experience because it encapsulates chaotically all purposeful procedural phases. Its greatest weakness is the extreme structural imperfection of the affects embodied in their apparent organization. The subject seems to experience a purposive structure because it erupts suddenly, subtly and powerfully, while in principio he is dealing with a potential affective organization that compensates for its chaotic nature with the power of its subtle eruption and duration. Wild enthusiasm and its structure are like a pieces of ember: they glow subtly, but do not burn strongly. The expression of subtlety encapsulates, suppresses, and at the same time originally radiates the concrete power of intensity. Wild enthusiasm must be “unpacked.” Its spontaneous and intuitive comparison with the purposive structures of the soul that are its elements and result of its “unpacking” will reveal its weakness, that is, the weakness of its constitution that initiates other relevant structurings.

We will not, at least not in this book, gradually compare Wild Enthusiasm with Vainglory and Obsession. The previous paragraph reveals the elementary structural differences. We believe that, at this point, it is as exhaustive as it is comprehensive. This does not mean that we will abandon the necessity of showing why the general structure of narcissism, or in the dynamic sense of the word – the cognitive procedure of wild enthusiasm, precedes the purposive soul structures. Why it hints at them, but cannot come close to them so much as to be restructured and transformed into them directly.

We have just defined in general terms the weakness of wild enthusiasm. But its weakness has other features that intrude into its conglomerate as such.

The lack of consciousness-of-power stifles the subject’s organizational efforts. Without consciousness-of-power as an adjunct to the object of interest, the affective structure of wild enthusiasm becomes as vague as the object of interest because it cannot identify the gravity towards which it is moving. The absence of the consolidating compass breaks up the affects and leaves them to float, to attract, to collide and to merge briefly in the impersonal solipsistic atmosphere. The subject desperately needs a force, empirical, mystical, of any kind, similar to the attraction invented by Newton to justify the law of gravitation. For him, attraction is a force that unites mathematical correlates, functions and factors into a homogeneous system on the one hand and a supra-mystical and supra-empirical force on the other. It homogenizes the mathematical description and the real mechanisms of the functional world¹⁴. Power is also not only a value that unites the obsessions of grandiose narcissism under a systemic structures, but also a supra-anthropomorphic energy that has no real being outside of pure transcendent immanence. It devalues ​​any laughs at every object or subject that wants to identify with it.

The junctions of the affects are peculiar outbursts that affect the subject as small, short and basic explosions. They occur here and there, while the subject is self-absorbed in the field of his own passion and becomes a fresh object of wild enthusiasm. While experiencing and empathizing with at least one chaotic connection between two internal affects, the subject simultaneously feels the following state, brilliantly conceived by Foucault: “time seems to exist only in the empty moment of explosion, in the paradoxical timeless movement that is filled with nothing while one formation is replaced by another. Since positivities are synchronic and replacements instantaneous, time disappears. At the same time, the possibility of describing history disappears”¹⁵. If we replace history with the affects of wild enthusiasm, we will understand what impression their interaction makes on the subject. Simply put, the subject feels the influences of the affect at once and cannot decide on either, because they merge beyond recognition. On the other hand, he cannot experience their substantial synthesis either, because it is under-cut by the two influences. In this direction, the subject now feels the bias and feels biased, now strives strongly towards the object, now is overwhelmed by the prevailing contexts of the motive.

There are still many strong, connotatively modified, lightning-fast and explosive connections and detachments. All short-lived outbursts are leveled in the field of deep manic passion that has its own time. The subject anticipates their chaotic co-presence and collective influence in the background, even when they do not erupt and do not reveal themselves to consciousness and feelings serially and disorderly. Chaotic co-presence is connected and identified with the disorderly emergence, union, rupture and replacement of affects. Collective influence is equated in everything with the serial manifestation of arbitrary connections. Indeed, while moving collectively, affects influence the subject. From this perspective, they structure themselves circumplexly, that is, they spread more or less evenly within the perimeter of their space¹⁶. While co-existing chaotically, they falsely organize the chaotic toposphere, which means that their additional structure is simple. They nestle into each other, but leave space for the individual connections to be revealed, just as in simple structures “items fall into tight clusters, with gaps between the clusters”¹⁷.

Every affective outburst aims to consolidate the subject and inextricably bind his consciousness to the contents of power. While being deceived, the subject treats the power hidden in the unconscious, like someone who has seen his closest friend directly, but has not recognized him because he has developed dementia. Or the friend is deliberately disguised so as not to be recognized by the subject, although his eyes betray who he really is. However, this missed opportunity to get to know power, that is, the broken disposition of power, elevates wild enthusiasm to a pedestal. Turns it into a primary and primordial value that the subject must reckon with. It establishes its own law of gestalt-interaction, or rather, it overturns the fundamentals on which the classical law rests. It does not unite convergent affects to obtain an intermediate product that will reflect them perfectly in its own unique and self-identical figure. It does not try to sew up differences so that the identical can rearrange the different in accordance with common possibilities and rules, and yet integrate within all that seems useless and unadaptable¹⁸. It uses their original chaotic unity to produce a chimera that will transform into a single body of disparate elements. The elements themselves can unite in an intentional structure and compose a smooth affective body that moves elegantly and spontaneously. But it deliberately creates a distorted structure in order to present them in the strongest and strangest post-structuralist light. However twisted its activity, wild enthusiasm seeks to create its own complex and direct it towards dispositional potentials and realizations.

11.

There are other metaphors that bring wild enthusiasm and its manifestations to life. Here is one of them.

The affective structure of wild enthusiasm is reminiscent of the narrow, twisted, branched and long tunnels in the massive areas of the mountains that are a special challenge for people looking for adrenaline events. Whichever path the spelunkers choose, sooner or later they face dead ends and impasses. Somewhere pressure is lower due to the lack of air and the presence of atmospheric gases, somewhere higher, because the tunnels are filled with water. The pressure is physically greatest where the crevices and natural corridors are narrowest, and psychologically strongest – after the spelunker realizes that he has missed the direction while diving underwater. The affects of the conglomerate of wild enthusiasm attack with varying power and in various configurations. They play the role of individual cave constellations and areas. The bias suffocates the subject while he thinks about the object of interest. The intention and motive help him to relax and desire it more freely. Passion oppresses the subject and crushes him constantly, now stronger now weaker, depending on the coherent influence of the other sub-affects. A similar feeling of fear and excitement is experienced by the spelunker as he conquers the structures of the cave. His manic-depressive state varies depending on what cave constellations he is faced with and how they affect the constitution of his tolerances. However, there is one intense constant that characterizes all individual situations. The caver begins to panic eerily as he becomes increasingly aware that he has trapped himself in the unsurpassable alleys of the mountain. In parallel, the subject dies within himself but cannot free himself from the feeling of being trapped in the solipsistic field of wild enthusiasm that suffocates him.

Their manner is common, the feelings are partly same, but the consequences are different. The subject goes through a painful procedure that has dangerous and deadly variations and cunning epitomes. He does not literally die and kill himself like the spelunker who matches the wrong procedure with the perfidious configuration of cave structures. The objective structure of wild enthusiasm varies within itself because substitution highlights the affects. It is not a static and pre-arranged entity, it is not a random and innocent trap in which the caver leaves the last miscalculations along with his own body. Its passive interior is so composed that the spelunker need only enter for the dangerous metrics of the interior to distort any calculated exit attempt. Static metric qualities are like monsters and demons that plot and use exclusively the actions of the spelunker to execute him. In this sense, the miniature caves and their suffocating blood-streams are much more morbid than wild enthusiasm and its affects. The affects of wild enthusiasm parade in a hellish circle, consuming and melting the psychoenergetic potentials that the subject has accumulated to experience the dispersive synthesis of the same affects. It is enough for the subject to submit mentally to wild enthusiasm to become the object of its psychic machinations, for its chaotic procedure to grind him into its machine. The structure of wild enthusiasm is destructive because it subtly exhausts the soul. The structure of the seduction is destructive because it subtly exhausts the soul. The affects are like mad and evil dancers who tear it apart while harnessing it in a bizarre dance and manipulating it through seductive movements. To distract the subject from this exsanguination of the soul, craze and affectations fill his self-certainty with grandeur, with delusional self-projections, with empty but powerful imaginings. The subject identifies the feeling of presence in the current chronotope with states of grandiose narcissism. Finally, the excitement full of confidence and composure turns into a hollow stress that has no time for anything but to worry the subject, to see in everything terrible challenges and to signal dangers to him. He is tired of everything in the world, except for the impulse of fear that arises at the slightest opportunity to face the realities of phobic compulsions. The very post-wild enthusiastic behavior of the subject is psychophysical proof of this. The subject longs at the same moment to resurrect self-love. That is, to give him cool-blooded courage and suddenly make him ready to spontaneously respond to any challenge. But the thief has already escaped with a full bag. In the reality of hollow stress, self-love is a helpless ghost that watches impotently his inferior reactions and shameful withdrawals. Self-love cannot grow so much that it will save him from the bare fear of situations that he imagines to be dangerous. The more frequent the wild enthusiasm, the less fruitful the soul becomes over the time scale of its life.

Spelunkers die as a result of their love of narrow spaces. Their claustrophilic nature creates the conditions for death. The subject does not want to sacrifice ecstatic potentials to irresistible psychic sterility. Therefore, he firmly grasps the additional basic approach, that is, the “wholesome” individual operational action, as the spelunker climbs the rope to leave the suffocating and airless spaces of the labyrinth of irregular tunnels. Wild enthusiasm is atypically suffocating, its repressive nature is akin to the repressive nature of cave structures. Its solipsism creates conditions for claustrophilia. Solipsism is a psychic atmosphere full of low pressure. The atmosphere seduces the subject and encourages him to desire acute dizziness, the ever-living urge to faint. The more pleasant the affects interwoven into the structure of wild enthusiasm, the more irresistible the dizziness itself. It encourages them and they encourage it. This psychic state of the subject softens vainglory with which we will deal later. Makes it drinkable and easy, despite the fact that the urge to faint is sharp and eo ipso naturally repulsive at times. Vainglory is based on a strictly constructed hierarchy of affects in the soul structure. It does not allow the subject to faint, even symbolically, intoxicated by ecstasy. Vainglory articulates the psychoenergetic and psychomental ecstasy. This imperial affect does not allow the subject to even think to enable and achieve the supreme effect of wild enthusiasm, nor to secretly hope to derive some benefit from practicing it covertly. Wild enthusiasm extracts from vainglory basic dark rapture and transforms it into its most powerful supplement. But vainglory and its limiting phenomenology need not interfere. It is the ultimate goal, which underlies all soulful actions and encapsulates all their subtexts. However, the constant urge for progress in domination and power forces the subject to sacrifice his inclinations to gamble with death to preconceived life paths.

Since we have strayed from the main path, we will have to recall at least the most basic rational causes and consequences. The subject “imagines” a sector of life where he prevails unquestionably and invincibly. But since this affective representation contains nothing but hypnagogic and visuogenic assumptions, chaotic images that need to be shaped constructively, and a vivid sphere that presupposes semantic processes, the subject has reached a dead end. After that, the subject imagined a homogeneous and powerful operational action that attracted him even more to the affective power of wild enthusiasm. He imagined the action prompted by the union of acts and intentions into a complex and continuous whole. But this action also got stuck in the same dead end. Therefore, now the subject will try to vivisect the homogeneous action. The vivisection will again take place within the framework of abstract visuogenicity and invisible hypnagogy.

While the subject is unconsciously confronted with the fundamental absence, he instinctively seeks a way to compensate for it. Such a role is playing the substantial operational action that arises from the life sector. Action is substantial, not because it has a fulfilling content, but because the subject invests all his egocentric energy in its transcendent and abstract basis. While thinking about this module of action, the subject comes to the conclusion that action is subordinate to intention. Intention formally justifies its existence, reveals its value to consciousness and outlines initial initiatives. But there is more important factor of action. Intention is its hallmark. It is the motive. The motive conceives the being of intention.

Intention is evidence that the subject has noticed a life situation that is significant to him. It is not blind to the contexts of the life situation, but takes into account only its basic potentials and limitations. The subject intends because he knows in general what he wants to achieve. Awareness of general possibilities constitutes intention. But the motive finds specific benefits, which encourage the subject to develop the intention. The motive organizes the intention, the potentials of the situation and the general possibilities through the means of benefits. Thus, the necessity to act is born in the soul of the subject.

A motive is not only a productive feeling that the subject develops within himself. The intention, follows a similar logic: it is not just thinking of something that can be done or should be done. The thought of productive intention, that is, the outlined need something to be done, together with the anticipated benefits, reinforce and strengthen the productive feeling that encourages the subject to engage and act. Therefore, the intention helps the motive to be established, and the motive helps the intention to develop. Motive animates the intention and necessity to act, and intention lays down the basic structure of potential action. They are impulses that deaccidentalize action. But its concrete contextual development does not depend on them. They are a kind of instructive cores; cognitive predispositions and attitudes on which every concrete initiative taken depends. Both contain affective notes that complement each other. They inject the subject with subtle energies that move him and push him to action. Intention is a weaker affect, because it treats circumstances provisionally, and does not prioritize benefits. Once a motive arises, it cannot decline to intention, because benefits influence the productive feelings more than provisionally treated circumstances. However, intention can replace motive, if the subject realizes certain structures and fulfills their conditions. Then new needs arise, which demotivate the subject, until his intention provides him with certain knowledge that will move things off the finished track. The motive can appear in advance, but it fades much faster than when specific initiatives are laid down in its foundation and if new benefits appear on the horizon.

In order to burst forth with all its force, the motive must emerge from the synthesis of subjective and objective benefits. For intention the benefits are hypnagogic figures on the periphery of the horizon whose favorability the subject anticipates ambiguously. The intention does not only consider the potentials of the fertile situation, but must also be coordinated with the objective possibilities of the subject that can potentially be developed. Thus, the intention and the motive surrender their powers to each other. If the motive focuses on subjective possibilities, the intention is concerned with the potentials of the situation and vice versa. The motive connects productive experiences with the intention and the necessity to act by encouraging the subject to structure the meanings of subjective possibilities and situational potentials in accordance with the goal. The intention also returns productive experiences to the embrace of the motive from which they originally emerge, because it directs the subject relatively affectively towards the relations that the subjective and objective spheres should establish. For the intention, experiences are positive, because it has not fully revealed their productive essence, that is, the beneficial essence of what they impregnate. For the motive, they are unquestionably productive because it has before it aperte (openly) their symbolic double: the benefits. In this sense, the necessity to act is an innocent observer and a disadvantaged student, who gathers strength and prepares to appear on stage. Action is a core idea that runs through all abstract segments of cooperation between the motive and the intention. It is like a severed head lying helplessly in the open space and waiting for the hands of motive and intention to lift it and place it on the decapitated body. The latter in this case symbolizes the aspiration that is justified by the achievement of the goal.

Intention initially overshadows motive. In order to discover benefits, at least a basic semantic connection between subjective possibilities and situational potentials must first be established. If the subject finds such connections, intention will actualize motive. It will turn into an intellectual instinct that will seek out specific benefits in the connections and work around the benefits to acquire them. It is not a consequence of the benefits, but an intensity that expands while searching for them and after finding them. The semantic connections between the subjective and the objective and the benefits that arise from them conceive the action, direct it, and potentially embody it. They create a kind of behavioral pattern that the action should transform into a physical model. At a given moment, intention and motive will so affect the subject with the necessity to act that he will transform them into “chemical elements” and incorporate them into the hypothetical action. Their mixture will substantialize the action. The action will become substantial because it will most strongly encourage the subject to engage. It also has an ideal form, because it encapsulates all possible modes of dispositional operation related to the given action.

This two-component action will not only integrate the intention and the motive, but will turn them into a fixatives¹⁹, into a tissue that maintains its structure in a homogeneous state. It will abolish and anticipate simultaneously both forms of distance: the purely metric and the spatial distance²⁰. Spatial distance has metric properties, but it differs from purely metric distance. Objects are spatially distant from each other. This means that their metric parameters are determined by the physical gap that separates them from each other. The attributes and qualities of objects in space are also distant from each other within the objects themselves. But their distance from each other is immediate (meaning without a physical gap) and fixed in the homogeneous space of the object. It can be measured but is treated as trans-spatial. There is a distance between two attributes and qualities, but this does not create a gap between them. The gap is outside their relation. The subject uses it as an independent intermediary to measure them. The gap is fictitious and depends on the metric parameter. Such is the trans-spatial form of distance. The distance of objects in space can be transformed into a homogeneous and trans-spatial one, if the objects are compressed one to another. Then they themselves and their qualities will establish a pure metric distance, and will abolish spatial distance. Accordingly, pure metric distance disintegrates spatial distance. And conversely, spatial distance abolishes metric if it separates objects and dissolves their immediate contact. Only the measurable content of objects is constantly independent of spatial and constitutes pure metric distance.

Hypothetical action is so powerful that it forces the subject to turn towards it. Action is active and inactive at the same time. As much as it reflects its own dynamic content, the general dynamics of relations, the series of complementary and isolated events, the immediate consequences, the surprising twists and expected reciprocities, it kills them in its ideal and substantial, or rather, pure form, like a psychopath in a bloody hut. How can action be different when it inflicts the visuogenic sphere into which semantic expressions and picturesque contents merge, and the hypnagogic entities that deform classified figures? If action acquires such power, which is not an unexpected feeling for the subject who is wildly enthusing himself, the dispositional role of intention and motive is exhausted. They are transformed into derivatives that merge and distort in the body of the center. They intensify the experience, the expression and the impression left by the hypothetical action, they no longer encourage and form it, but submit to it. They prevail over the action while the subject contextualizes it abstractly, that is, in accordance with their disembodied dynamic scheme. These essences withdraw after the action has come on stage and has further electrified the soul that they have already pricked.

12.

This is how experienced action most originally presents the feeling of power. It is localized within itself and localizes within itself everything that is associated with it. A dense narcissistic-dominance energy radiates from it. It possesses the psychoenergetic, quasi-spatial and dynamic constitution of the feeling of power. But it differs from the latter in that it is a concept of purposeful and directed movement. The feeling of power and power itself are quasi-spatial centers, which accumulate all the essences related to their growth and development. Even if they were concrete, its dynamics and its movements would not upgrade power. They would only justify it. To say that power grows is the same as saying that power justifies itself. It does not, in itself, decrease or increase. It possesses external parameters that create conditions for it to be more impressive, or worsen conditions and make it less impressive. It is self-identical both before and behind the veil. But still, the movements and dynamics of action must be productive, if the subject wants to extract from power its φάνεια. The purposeful production of movements creates conditions that are conditio sine qua non for power to manifest itself as equal to itself. Action is its inevitable and most original proof of concept. Regardless of whether the subject does not succumb to the invincible disposition of the tyrant or is himself in some game-changing advantage and uses it. Action cannot be a causeless and even less a purposeless movement. It must be a meaningful movement and have pleasant dynamics which together characterize the production of dispositional states. The production of movements and dynamics that constitutes dispositional states must prove that meaning has value.

The hypothetical action that absorbs the life sector that the subject controls leaves such an impression. In fact, the subject draws the action and its model onto the psychomental stage, or rather, the mode, because the representation in which the action participates and co-constitutes, has no visual content. Meanwhile, his feeling of superiority is stimulated by two factors: first is the absolute power of the subject over the sector, the second is the hypothetical action that takes on all responsibility for dispositional events. The first encourages him to redirect himself, because it is a symbol of a completed achievement. The second encourages him to move in the detected direction, because intention and motive are forces that sleep, but can be awakened by the fresh winds that blow towards them. He experiences strongly the outline of a meaningful movement²¹. It is equated with intention and motive according to the quality and skill with which it encourages intelligible shifts in the direction of new perspectives. The more persistently and consistently he does this, the more pretentiously he delves into the action to understand and appropriate its meaning. Absolute power over the life sector is already a background vibration that intensifies and illuminates hypothetical action. Action completely takes on the function of a driver of the dispositional striving towards newly discovered horizons. It gathers into one whole all the previous elements of general striving and leads them without giving them the right to vote or speak.

But the visuogenic-hypnagogic dead end lurks on all sides. With each step towards the concrete contents of narcissistic dominance, the subject becomes dully passionate and falls into the rabbit hole of wild enthusiasm. Wild enthusiasm fills him with pure motives and pure intentions, sends them to him through his own affects. He follows the tracks like a dull-witted dog without even thinking once that he is spinning in the circle of the set-up self-affection. It brazenly takes the place of action and proclaims itself ruler of all dispositional movements and dynamics. The subject returns to the original power again, only this time the affective complex is known to him in its entirety. It is not like the complex of hypothetical action, which is mysterious, because the subject is facing it for the first time. When he embodied intentions in actions and actions were equated with intentions, reduced to intentions and deconstructed in accordance with their initial commitment, he could not feel and experience the power of action per se. Now he has the chance to develop this magical thread, but he has fallen again under the power of affective and ecstatic solipsism.

The subject is not at a crossroads but on the edge of a precipice. Individual operational action as a transitional basic complex has failed. Wild enthusiasm should also have lifted the subject to help him act courageously. But its additional basic approach has not fulfilled the task. The subject is squeezed into a tight spot. All abstract perspectives escape his creative vision. Therefore, he chooses the dual model of hypothetical action and absolute dominance over the life sector. He believes that if he finds at least some vivid analogy for them and their synthesis, he will touch the weak point of wild enthusiasm.

At first glance, the subject acquires, possesses, and experiences everything he needs to start acting courageously, regardless of whether that all is virtual (transcending in the direction of vivid contents) and abstract (transcending in the direction of their contexts, or semantic expressions). Wild enthusiasm replaces all affective structures and merges them into one affect through ecstatic solipsism. As he introspects the hypothetical action, he feels his power increase. More precisely, as he empathizes with the complex and pure representation of a meaningful movement, he empathizes with the intense expression of self-sufficient and self-identical power. He transposes himself in relation to the action to see it as an operational unit that fills him with admiration and a will to power. Absolute power over the pure life sector displaces him from the position of someone who seeks meaning and purpose in self-projective representations. It places him on the top of a mountain, to observe in super-perspective all the horizons of dominance that open before him and before the life sector. From above, he perceives both future privileges and the behavioral pattern.

This temporary and transitory disposition electrifies the soul so much that, if it is already wildly enthused it will suddenly detonate the latter’s affects. It will exhaust itself with one cruel stroke. Is there a better circumstance than this? Before it self-exhausts, that is, before the subject exhausts his soul while embarking on a deadly adventure with wild enthusiasm, he will not be able to act courageously. He will not be composed, and his actions will be extremely inarticulate, touched by the hand of madness. But is such a modus operandi not appropriate for this desperate situation?

At least it will hit the mark. At least it will show that wild enthusiasm is not the same as madness. Wild enthusiasm regulates the states of the cowardly lunatic, sharpens his mind, articulates his behavior at crucial moments, disciplines his lucid ecstasy, sticks his face in the phantasmagoric goal in order to force him to follow it. This is how wild enthusiasm takes root in the being of the lunatic who is trying to become brave from a stain of veins. It creeps into him through its sister, madness, and nourishes his ambitions, teaches him not to trade in the stoic habits of egocentrism. In the end, it truly rewards him. Wild enthusiasm does this only because madness is its sister, regardless of the subject. Without the echoes and tickles of madness, without its ability to autistically delve into obscure impulses and follow them with hunting precision, without his irremediable rapture where personal horror conspires with the cruel pulling of the burden, wild enthusiasm will be a petty passion that imagines itself to be especially powerful and influential, when it is not. It knows this and is infinitely grateful to madness. That is why it wants to help.

The subject is not crazy. Therefore, it sees no need to make him stronger. It has no such powers. Anyone who succumbs to wild enthusiasm, and is weak by nature, ends up being ground into her ecstatic, affective, and solipsistic whirlpools. Therefore, the subject wastes in vain the exceptional sublime phenomenon that we have described earlier. Under appropriate circumstances and conditions, the sublime phenomenon could have achieved a breakthrough. But what consequences and outcomes await the subject further?

The attempt to unite action and one’s own life sector in order to produce new dispositional horizons and new perspectives of dominance is too rapid according to the subject. He has not created a single image of either action or life sector, or of one’s own dispositional responsibilities within it. Moreover, he has not specified action. Does it reflect only dispositional responsibilities in the sector, or does it extend to new perspectives and horizons and include new ventures and strategies? Finally, how is the life sector related to the latter, if the subject has not identified it as such? In order to engage in such unconstructive activities, the subject must first be able to skillfully shape images. Complex existential representations are not within his reach. It is clear that he is not prepared for this.

Fortunately, all these existential perspectives and focuses of action return the subject to the concept of representation. The power of the life sector gathered and transformed into a dispositional event is freshly present in his mind. Incidentally, the mind is more active than the imagination, because the subject deals with transcendent and immanent contents, regardless of the fact that they belong to the visuogenic, not the semantic field. The subject then carried out two cognitive procedures. First, he dragged the dispositional event into the common field of mind and imagination, in order to experience it as authentically as possible. Second, in order to experience it authentically, he relived the event from multiple linear perspectives using locomotor attention. In other words, the subject learned to connect the segments and draw clear conclusions from their connections in the plot whole.

The subject has no problem experiencing and perceiving mental representations, especially not those that are by nature completely identical to the mechanisms of pure representation. Since he has mostly mastered the most complex aspect of representation, the nature of mental representation does not pose any obstacles. However, the organization of visual content is not as easy as it seems at first glance. The subject is convinced prima facie, he is a live victim of the same crime. Locomotor attention is more valid for organized visual content, which has unraveled the hypnagogic knot and cleared the visuogenic field. That is why we do not consider it when we spoke of instruction and its visuogenic and hypnagogic operations. But intuition grows into the way its mechanism works, controls it from within and reduces it to its own means and ways of expression. Each mechanism of visual representation and dissection of visual content has its own virtual dynamics and structure, which can be translated into abstract, i.e. semantic language. More than that. Now the subject is not between the intuitive and the visuogenic sphere, nor is he between the visuogenic and the hypnagogic sphere. He now passes from the hypnagogic to the sphere of organized visual contents. More precisely, all the attempts that the subject undertakes in parallel with the experience he acquires of wild enthusiasm are attempts to organize visually the hypnagogic potentials. Action, dispositional events, motive, intention, etc. are categories that succeed only in an existential and visual context. The process itself and the scope of complex essences and connections that it involves indicate that here the inconstructive knot is most entangled.

Since the subject has spontaneously and unconsciously sketched the relationship between action and the life sector, he will try to structure the relationship and present to himself a mode of hypothetical action. This mode will bring him as close as possible to the model. In other words, the subject will compose a virtual whole, which will become the pattern of all arbitrary face-like images. So, he identifies action with responsibilities in the life sector, so that after perfecting the life sector, he can disperse action and connect it to new dispositional-perspective flows, areas and potentials. Action and the operational base embodied in the sector will be directed in solidarity towards the exterior. Every expansive-extensive operational structure is based on such starting points of things. Therefore, this structure of relationship that arises from the sketch, although it is itself a kind of sketch, turns into a template for the image. But the saga of operational constitution, preparation, and expansion does not end here. The mode of action also includes other components that relate exclusively to action and symbolically exclude the life sector. Such are the configurations of antagonistic othernesses from the exterior, the individual operational acts and risky attempts that embody action, and complexes of instructions, novelties that originate from self-coordinated reflection, and reflexive reactions against stagnation. The latter network the action within itself and consolidate it. The last qualities, or characteristics that refer to action in specie, are not elements of any action but of action that aims to overpower. Overpowering always prefers antagonistic othernesses of any type, bases its role on them and gives the action a recognizable identity. For example, only the objective obstacle that the subject experiences as a strong factor of stagnation is antagonistic role-model.

The subject is distracted by the shiny thing called overpowering. He examines overpowering from all sides like a broken gold detector and as if the object of interest itself were a precious diamond. The previously mentioned qualities “impose” on the action the typical dominating essence. These are not operational factors that apply to every challenge and every obstacle. The challenge and obstacle should be on the wavelength of his narcissistic-dominance initiatives and visions. If the subject wants to focus attention on the dynamic ratio between action and the life sector, there is nothing to be gained from it. Action is as unknown to him in concreto as the functional structure of the life sector. Their ratio is empty. The subject does not know what functional role action plays in the life of the sector. His role certainly cannot be operational, because the operational role implies a systematic confrontation with challenges that go beyond the closed system of the sector. Functional management involves the resolution of internal challenges. But action can at least hypothetically step out of the life sector, since it possesses a transcendental constitution of operative and overpowering qualities. He sees salvation in this point, as if it were a gap in thick clouds.

13.

Intuition and attention worked hand in hand, as the subject became familiar with the instructional mechanisms. Moreover, he had long before become acquainted with the general functional structure of attention through the myth of Argus, the first maze challenge in the film of the same name and through some other arbitrary examples. Finally, his collection of attentional insights was reinforced by new locomotor perspectives. Therefore, the subject now seeks to develop the poor knowledge he has acquired about the characteristics of overpowering action by harnessing overpowering action within the fold of locomotor attention.

The subject focuses on the characteristics of overpowering (it is already understood that domination is a core type of action, so we will not use the introductory oxymoronic phrase). He finally excludes the action contained in the life sector and the life sector as such, no matter how complementary and contained in the extraterritorial systemic activities they are. In fact, the extraterritorial role of the system depends on them. Now before his consciousness the action directed towards the antagonistic challenges is straightened. It is like a machinist in a monstrous machine that manages all the functions alternately. This does not mean that antagonistic challenges are only external. Any internal threat that has a high coefficient of entropic risk turns into an antagonistic challenge. The high temperature of the risk and the degree of impatience towards the challenge that arises from the first one shape the antagonistic relationship.

However, the subject again does not possess a dynamic structure of antagonistic othernesses to oppose. Therefore, he cannot deploy the characteristics of overpowering operationally in accordance with the alternating activities of the challenge. For example, the subject may act according to prescribed instructions in an antagonistic atmosphere. But the body of action will be torn apart by many unpredictable events from the unknown environment. The subject will be faced with a completely new situation. He will not be given the opportunity to combine and synchronize reflexive reactions and self-coordinated reflection with the given plan, but will immediately be thrown into the abyss of absolute improvisation. Or if he manages to make a plan and compile instructions that will extract him intelligently and systematically from the given situation, no one guarantees that the operation will succeed and that the subject will not face new deadly surprises. Then, even, it will no longer be a question of overpowering actions, but of actions that enable salvation and relative sustainability. It is debatable how much can be called overpowering action that takes place in an extremely unfavorable circumstance. The criterion for overpowering is to have objective elements of disposition over the entire circumstance. In this situation, the subject struggles to regain the lost disposition. We will repeat, in order to measure his forces and to test in action the characteristics of mastery, the subject must confront a concrete antagonistic structure. Until then, any attempt to distribute, arrange and structure the characteristics will turn into a mixture of pre-configured possibilities.

A significant substrate of overpowering is overwhelming. The subject overwhelms whenever he win over segments of the challenge that are difficult to overcome. It is a key interval of overpowering, without which the subject cannot experience overpowering in all its magnitude. Overwhelming is a kind of salire pathologica (pathological leap) from a feeling of intense pleasure to a feeling of manic self-satisfaction. Overwhelming allows the subject to be flooded with feelings of dominance. While overpowering, the subject is drowned by a flood of victorious experiences. Therefore, overcoming often directly denotes the flooding-of-something-with-something. Overwhelming is not just a symbol for being flooded-with-something. It is an act of overpowering that is transformed into victorious feelings that flood the subject.

In this sense, superiority is only a spark of the experiences that the subject feels while overwhelming the other. Overpowering takes all the credit. At times it seems like a divinity, unattainable and numinous, although it is the heart of all dispositional processes. Superiority is no longer the center of narcissistic-dominance affairs. It is more reminiscent of the verb to prevail, which means it turns into a sharp awareness, and with it, into pure proof that the subject is stronger than antagonistic othernesses. It no longer leads the processes of disposition, that is, the symbolic positioning of oneself above others. Along with it, the value of the dispositional nature fades, because now dispositionality is an echo of deeper aspirations. Analogous to this revocation is the following state of affairs. While the subject prevails over significant difficulties while in an extremely unfavorable and subordinate position, he does not overwhelm but overcome. Overcoming is reduced overwhelming. It refers to the successful struggle with relative difficulties in relative challenges. If we start from domination as the basic category of dynamic coping with challenges, we will say that the other categories are intensam expugnaturum formae (forms of intense overcoming).

It is not a problem that the subject cannot imagine situations and purposeful events that involve exclusively scenes of systematic overpowering. Not that the subject cannot overturn this ideal pattern of failed cooperation between characteristics. This is easily done. There is a guideline that the subject follows while acting. He responds reflexively and uses self-coordinated reflection whenever he needs to make significant shifts and perform a quintessential feat. His plan is approximate, which leads to homeostatic successes. The subject has no problem changing the plan radically and displacing the guideline, if victory and glory demand it of him, whenever he is faced with insurmountable obstacles. He overwhelms the obstacles, increases the feeling of superiority and strengthens the dominant tendencies. Even when he finds himself in an extremely unfavorable situation, whether through his own fault or because of objective circumstances, he manages to transform the overcoming into overwhelming. Relative obstacles are often as great as the insurmountable obstacles contained in the antagonistic challenge. But because the subject is not dispositioned, they retain their relativity and do not become what they are according to their objective magnitude. The subject extricates himself from the agonizing situation with a magnificent feat, which replaces and compensates for all successful and glorious operational undertakings in conditions of relative disposition. All the dazzling feats, dynamize dominance, which is sluggish and imprudently complacent with power, transform it into overpowering. Thus dominance receives fresh blood and is renewed.

Are these heroic phantasms and rotten ideations appropriate? No, they exude something extremely rotten. Ideal structuring of overpowering and its practical and psychoenergetic components fill the subject with an ephemeral sense of greatness. It is like a bloodless wild enthusiasm, which erupts episodically, after prolonged periods, waving anemically and too briefly, overworkedly, unable to catch its breath, let alone speak. First, there must be concrete scenes from which the subject will be able to extract the objective and general structures of overpowering. The structures of overpowering are general because they cannot be imagined without the interaction they establish with antagonistic othernesses. They are objective because they are embodied in complexes composed of vivid existential procedures. Moreover, the scenes will help the subject to learn how the characteristic structure of overpowering is permeated in the acts and formations of mutual opposition, and consequently how it co-constitutes them with antagonistic othernesses. The ideal manifestation of the characteristics is in itself a prerequisite for stagnation, it does not bring progress. The patterns of ideal manifestations must be extracted from the configurations of existential events.

But the subject does not have such a privilege. He has remembered dispositional events from the past that concern him, but they have become stuck in the dead end of the non-arbitrary configuration. By non-arbitrary configuration we mean simple events of personal superiority grounded in the dispositional posture and his starting position. Therefore, he must first know these patterns of overpowering characteristics, and then draw visual strokes and organize the assumed images. Their arbitrariness will provide him with new dispositional configurations that will surpass posture and position in such a way as to dynamize his master role. In order to organize and extract the arbitrary face-like images from the unconscious, the subject must know all the stages of virtual and abstract, visuogenic and semantic, supposition about how images are organized visually.

The subject does this. He follows a course of progress that is neither inductive nor deductive. Sometimes, he includes in his conception entire complexes. Such was the case with the characteristics of overpowering. Other times, he establishes an action, or a simplified face-like image, and develops and fits them into other multi-perspective states depending on the convolutive and metonymic demands of the trajectory. He impresses upon his mind that every representation of overcoming possesses this or that constellation of ideal characteristics. Therefore, it is not only a representation that objectifies strategic self-projection, but a principle of visual organization, which gives schematic instructions and suggests schematic possibilities to the subject. The principle of visual organization is not material to be implemented as such in the representation. They are symbolic properties of the representation on the basis of which the subject builds the image. They are in the image, but they are not the image itself. So the creative activity of the subject takes place entirely in the spirit of complex systems. The universal approach that the subject uses has an archetypal function. It predetermines all the individual steps in the field of design.

The subject continues to build the principle of visual organization dynamically, that is, over-inductively and over-deductively. There is another circumstance that favors such dynamics. The subject does not have to show interest exclusively in the complementary development of the overcoming, in order to experience, predict, recognize or perceive noticeable features of progress. The very nature of mental representation helps him to comfort, soothe and bear the burden of the dispersed progress which occurs gradually and comprehensively. In it, the complementary development is conditional and occurs according to the laws of Gestalt dynamics that sublimate the individual and the general, even when the subject is fully aware of the visual organization of events and knows it in detail.

Whatever the constellation of ideal characteristics of overpowering, the subject focuses on one of them, conceived purely hypothetically. From it he expels all admixtures of a struggle for self-preservation, and retains, intensifies and exaggerates all the relative dispositions that enable him to carry out the strategy confidently, gradually and without great turbulence. In order not to leave a gap in our description, we will devise such a constellation. In fact, the subject will choose the optimal constellation. He unties the strategic plans in reality. In the meantime, he reflexively reacts to urgent challenges, and self-coordinately reflects whenever something is wrong with the reflex reaction against the urgent challenge.

The subject introspects this (at the same time virtual and abstract) representation at length. While introspecting it, it arises, unfolds, and self-successions in various ways and in accordance with the comprehensive gestalt dynamics. The subject unfolds his strategy in reality. In the meantime, urgent challenges arise to which the subject must react reflexively. In other words, he must devise solutions that will be able to respond appropriately to the situation of urgency. Urgent challenges become more complicated at a given moment, so the subject must self-coordinate reflexively to deal with the complicated state of urgent events. This also means that he must develop reflex reactions into smart actions that will eliminate the perfidious outbursts of urgency. These two, instinctive-cognitive operational functions, are centralized in the strategy. Whatever happens outside and in reality, they are always transposed into the strategy, in order to measure the general state of affairs.

If there were concrete and connected scene representations, the subject would be able to imagine this formation of ideal characteristics of overpowering from different perspectives. Other standard ways of strategic and operational overpowering would have based the different perspectives. But since there are no such means, he must be content with this one-dimensional manifestation of the characteristics. He isolates the one-dimensional manifestation in the introspective space and places it against the background of prolonged psychic time. The relations between strategy, reflex reactions and self-coordinated reflection proceed in a complementary manner. From whatever perspective the subject views them, they form the above-mentioned general and (in the sense of the unsatisfied goal) exhaustive visual trajectory. Their relations do not proceed in phases, but they are a single integral phase that characterizes part of the standard strategic-operational undertakings. They can be embodied in various scene representations of the ratio and relationship between the urgent antagonistic manifestations and the quickly thought-out reactions of the subject. But because the scene representations are missing, the subject has an idea only of their general complementary unfolding. He cannot place them in the integral drama and in the segment of the whole that is most appropriate for them. Therefore, this integral phase is transformed into a unified complementary unfolding.

The subject treats the relationship between the unfolding of the strategy, the reflex reactions and the self-coordinated reflection as a single phase. This phase takes place complementary within itself and by itself. To arrange the instinctive-cognitive qualities of the phase in order, the subject uses locomotor attention. Thus, while perceiving the stages in the phase locomotorically and with expressed attention, he simultaneously prolongs introspection. Previously, the prolonged psychic time gave the subject the opportunity to pay attention locomotorally to events. Now, the locomotor attention to events, i.e. to the instinctive-cognitive stages in the phase, supports psychic time and does not allow it to fade away. The support that attention and psychic time give each other is simultaneous and epiphenomenal. Locomotion strengthens prolongation, just as prolongation opens up the psychic space for locomotion. The subject does not cross these introspective functions in order to perceive the complementary development in its entirety, but also in order to present it to himself from multiple perspectives contained in the monotonous frame. From whatever angle the subject sees what is happening, he cannot add or subtract anything from the introspective whole. He searches for individual relations in the integral phase, in order to conceive the phase as such from all sides. He tries to discover the concrete specifics of the relation between reflex reactions and self-coordinated reflection, or the response that one, the other or together give to urgent antagonistic challenges. In doing so, the subject does not conceive anything, he only anticipates the conceived relations. Therefore, their relation cannot be expanded, enriched and dispersed semantically, and the changing frame remains monotonous and tied to visual facticity.

The subject can contemplate deeply without imagining anything. He does not even try to penetrate with intuition into something that he anticipates in order to mentalize and represent it in the mind. Every rational being begins to think in this primitive way: either when it is at the beginning of its reflective adventure, or when it wants to continue doing something that it has not been doing for a long time. But the subject calls the prolonged psychic time into consciousness, awakens awareness of it, in order to focus on the complementary unfolding of instinctive-cognitive actions. If the subject cannot harmonize the prolonged psychic time with the unfolding of events, then prolongation turns into protraction. Parallel to it, the subject also constitutes the locomotor focus, in order to be able to observe the unfolding that is taking place from moment to moment. As he observes the unfolding from moment to moment, so the locomotor fixation lasts and continues. Once he has managed to harmonize attention and psychic time, he must not focus too much on one stage, no matter how exciting, hyperhedonic, and affectively productive it is. He must allocate attentional resources in such a way that they are distributed throughout the entire unfolding without a trace. He must fill the complementary trajectory with allocated resources in order to know and experience the event integrally and sublimely. In order to endure to the end, he must coordinate the unfolding, the prolongation, and the distribution of resources.

The gait kinematics must have spontaneous expression²². The subject cannot fully control the course of unfolding, nor establish complementarity as it occurs in historical reality and through historical time. But there must be, or must be established, a relative balance between the representation of unimpeded unfolding and the attempt to arrange the gestalt segments in a correct sequence. The subject has to link the gestalt segments he is trying to imagine in the correct order to the representation of the unimpeded unfolding. Thus, he will imagine an event that is taking place as if reflected in a shattered mirror. The gestalt segments that do not belong in the given trajectory will roughly impose on the event, and the representation of the unimpeded movement will try to place itself as if it were the only present and existing mental object. These (two) obstacles will resemble the paths formed by the broken pieces of glass. The pieces of glass stand at a relative distance from each other. Therefore, the whole of the mirror is relatively integral. The representation and the intrusive gestalt segments will interfere with the imagined event, but will not completely disrupt its correct course.

14.

The subject has no visual representation, therefore it anticipates the active role of attention. Protracted psychic time can be experienced as such at any time. It is substantial par excellence. But the gait-kinematic spontaneity must free itself from the empty form of protraction and establish the natural prolongation that drives the unfolding. The subject first begins to perceive the active mental sphere purely and retains it as such in consciousness. In meantime, he does not feel that the retention of the active mental sphere in consciousness is some kind of error, glitch or a pointless waiting for something unpredictable to happen. He knows that sometime, or rather soon, the event (or events), the segment (or segments) will begin to unfold.

While he perceives the imagined event as he can and as much as he can, the body movements of the subject do not enter into the gait-kinematic constancy of the unfolding. They are an immediate part of the representation, completely impregnated with it. While imagining gait-kinematics, the subject imagines the dynamic unity of bodily movements with the operational space where they manifest themselves and with whom they cooperate. But at the same time, he puts aside the classical gait-kinematic object of interest, in order to give priority to consciousness, to its condition for retaining mental matters, to attention and to its focus and fixation with the help of which consciousness encompasses the dynamic segments that follow one after another. Consciousness, attention and their implicit functions form the representation of continuous unfolding and are themselves integrated into it structurally-functionally. The subject knows that if he manages to keep such a representation alive, he will more easily string the segments together. If he starts to observe the way in which the subject moves in the operational space and uses it, he will distract himself and allocate significant resources to unnecessary internal perspectives. Even less does the subject care whether the movement is spontaneous, natural, and in harmony with the role the body is playing. On the contrary, consciousness and attention “hold on” to the spontaneous continuity of unfolding and perceive it uninterruptedly. They do not get distracted and do not allow too long concentration on other internal objects, relations and connections to disrupt the spontaneous continuity and turn it into an instrument of arbitrary ratios. Then, the very understanding of the concept of “unfolding” will be compromised and distorted; it will become hybrid and chaotic. Perhaps it will be clear and synoptically understandable to someone who met the teleological trajectory before it was torn and displaced.

If consciousness perceives the spontaneous continuity with the help of attention, it will save the complementary unfolding. Spontaneity allows the segments to naturally and smoothly follow each other. Complementarity is not a consequence of spontaneity, it is its external expression, it represents the natural sequence as it manifests itself here and now. More so, the representational unfolding will be synthetic and complementary in a gestalt manner. The Gestalt-appearance is always the same: the whole and the individual, static and the dynamic, the upper and the lower, the comprehensive and the local, the part and the whole, the trajectory and the segment, the space and the expanse mix with each other and coexist side by side, they are in-sistent and equi-sistent. But the dynamic form of self-identical Gestalt-appearance depends on the class of opposite pairs. In this sense, Gestalt-appearance is equal to the self-identical affect that changes its forms depending on the situation (more on this in Possession).

This primordial Gestalt equalization of opposites in the pair may lead us to think that the gait-kinematic whole manifests itself strongly even when the subject lingers too much and isolates segments of unfolding. Indeed, the subject chooses what to give priority to. But if he gives priority to one, the other immediately, not only strives, but forms its own ἐποχή. This can best be described with a classic optical example. If we direct the focus of the eye to an object that is behind another object, the front object will blur. The same will happen if we blur the back object. Then the object in front of it will crystallize. This does not mean that the subordinate object is not present and that the subject ceases to be aware of its presence. He sees it just like the object to which he gave priority, but with a distorted diopter. Therefore, by dwelling on certain, or on one segment of unfolding, consciousness will not abolish the gait-cinematic wholeness or the idea of ​​uninterrupted continuity. But it will suppress them so much that they will not be able to manifest themselves adequately, and will even be completely paralyzed, they will turn into a side and frozen object of focus. In order to save the semblance of spontaneous unfolding and constant complementarization, it will have to patch up the pure trajectory of the protracted psychic time, to fill it with segments. It will place them in an arbitrary order, or according to their hierarchy of affective powers.

The gait-kinematic whole is teleological expression of the segments that extend complementary in psychic time-space. Spontaneity, permanence, complementarity, uninterrupted unfolding are functional elements that allow the whole to manifest itself as best it can in gestalt conditions. In agreement with this, unfolding should not be identified with development. Unfolding exists only where the subject imagines a certain whole with which he has become fully acquainted. Development exists where the subject strives to create a whole, but invests more effort because, when he draws the trajectories of movement, they are not given to him in advance. No matter how dominant these aspects of integral gestalt manifestation may seem, they turn into a background point which is further overshadowed by the prominent segment. The subject imagines its specific unfolding. At the same time, he remembers and projects into the background the teleology of the complex of which the segment is a consistent part. Since we are dealing with Gestalt representations and Gestalt experiences, the subject sees the complex both as a small background point and as something that encompasses the entire mental space. However, the dot shape dominates, because the subject has chosen to devote his attention to the isolated segment, and not to the sequence of segments that unfold complementary. As the subordinate object blurs, so the image of this grandiose whole of segments, their related developments, separate unfolding, internal contents, and associative contexts, is reduced, faded, and transformed into a chaotic and drawn canvas on which the segment manifests its sharpened essence.

Gait-kinematics from bodily and operational, from practical and spatial, turns into attentional and mental, into segmental and consistent. In the case of the subject, gait-kinematic permanence is established if he binds the segments and their logical flow into a homogeneous sequence. Their complementary unfolding does not have to be perfect as when he sees picturesque scenes founded in the homogeneous nature of reality and material art. This gait-kinematics aims to create a relatively perfect synthesis of imagined objects. Classical gait-kinematics focuses on real manifestations. It sees how the body uses objects in space to achieve some goal. In doing so, the viewer must distribute the attentional means perfectly well and dynamically. At the same time, he must perceive thoroughly the action of the body, the qualitative arrangement of moves, the behavior of objects, the change of the spatial structure and the specific and simultaneous spirit of cooperation and resistance. Gait-kinematics in reality, that unfolds complementary sui generis, monitors the processes and tries to encompass everything in accordance with its qualitative manifestations.

The two gait-kinematic perspectives are completely opposite, despite the fact that they encompass purposive complexes. Material gait-kinematics focuses on wholes that unfold spontaneously, complementary and consistently in advance. It follows their unwavering flows and recognizes in them a worthy object of interest. It summarizes qualitative impressions, after having perceived everything that is significant and can be observed. Mental gait-kinematics, tends to organize the segments into a spontaneous and purposive whole, despite the fact that they themselves are components of such a pre-given whole, and tries to re-establish their unwavering flows. Because of the formal organization, it misses many exciting peculiarities. It behaves like someone who steps in the middle of a tile and moves in that style just to avoid stepping on the joints.

The complementary development and constant spontaneity do not give the subject the necessary satisfaction. Yes, he feels comfortable, even proud, that he manages to control mental processes. But bypassing exciting individualities rushes him and shortens the potentials of empathy. For the opposite to happen, the subject needs to abolish insight into the purposeful flow of things and allocation should begin to outweigh complementarity and spontaneity. Whenever attention shifts interest from complementary unfolding to segments and their exciting peculiarities, consciousness ceases to meet the basic criteria of gait kinematics. In order to perceive gait kinematically, the subject must allocate the attentional resources effectively, while alternately observing the development of the event. Allocation must align with complementary unfolding. Any attempt for the allocation to predominate over the complementary unfolding establishes interruptions and the segment begins to position itself above the whole. Even in material gait kinematic observation, the subject loses control over the situation if his attention is preoccupied with the concrete movement of the body, with its qualitative position, with the object and its strange behaviors, or with space and its contradictory structuring.

The allocation of gait-cinematic interests deadens gait-cinematic criteria. The shift of interest from the whole to the particular always produces the same result. If the subject becomes interested in the qualitative particularities of the operational cooperation between the body and the environment, it is as if he were more interested in the segments and their scenic logic than in the entire inscenation and its trajectory rich in meaning. The shift from the sphere of practical activities to the sphere of states of consciousness will have the same fate, if the subject does not focus on the whole and accept the individual.

---

1. Фрейд З., Малое собрание сочинений, Азбука, Санкт-Петерург, 2011, с. 738. ↩︎
2. Бодријар Ж., О завођењу, Октоих, Подгорица, 2001, с. 76. ↩︎
3. Ibid. ↩︎
4. Luhman N., Društveni sistemi. Osnovi opšte teorije, ↩︎
5. Lerner, H. D., & Peter, S. S. (1984). Patterns of object relations in neurotic, borderline and schizophrenic patients. Psychiatry, 47(1), pp. 77-92. ↩︎
6. Delez Ž, Logika smisla, Sandorf + Mizantrop, Zagreb, 2015, str. 160. ↩︎
7. Whenever the subject thinks of his I, he thinks of it as a pure mental correlate of himself and of nothing more than that. It is cut off from any concrete identification with the other. Everything exists to correlate with it, but it does not commit itself to anything. ↩︎
8. Lewin, K. (1936). A dynamic theory of personality: Selected papers. The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 84(5), p. 180-191. ↩︎
9. (Consciousness of) power, wild enthusiasm and narcissism form an irregular affective triangle. The three points of connection differ according to the strength of their role in the process of dominance and their various appearances on the scene, timed by the development and change of soul structures. ↩︎
10. A progressive image is one that is moving towards concrete arbitrary contents, but has not produced them yet. ↩︎
11. Мethod is approach insofar as it enables the subject to develop semantic structures. And approach is method insofar as it contains its own structures on the basis of which the subject performs advanced procedures. It is obvious that both forms of progressive activity are closely correlated with every immanent mechanism. ↩︎
12. Хайдеггер, Бытие и время, „Наука“, Слово о сущем, Том 70, Санкт-Петербург, 2007, 61. ↩︎
13. Dostoevski F.M., Braća Karamazovi,. ↩︎
14. Koyré, A. (1950). The significance of the Newtonian synthesis. The journal of general education, 4(4), p. 263. ↩︎
15. Фуко М., Археология знания, Издательскый центр „Гуманитарная академия“, Санкт-Петербург, 2012, с. 300. ↩︎
16. Barrett, L. F., & Russell, J. A. (1999). The structure of current affect: Controversies and emerging consensus. Current directions in psychological science, 8(1), 10-14. ↩︎
17. Ibid, 12. ↩︎
18. Glicksohn, J., & Goodblatt, C. (1993). Metaphor and Gestalt: Interaction theory revisited. Poetics Today, 83-97. ↩︎
19. A substance used to maintain the position of things or to hold them together; a chemical substance used to preserve or stabilize biological matter suitable for microscopy or other research, or a substance to stabilize the volatile components of a chemical. ↩︎
20. Householder, A. S. (1939). Lewin, Kurt. Principles of Topological Psychology. Translated by Fritz and Grace Heider. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936. Pp. 231. The Pedagogical Seminary and Journal of Genetic Psychology, 54(1), 249-259. ↩︎
21. We do not dare to say meaningful action, because that would be an oxymoron. Action cannot manifest itself otherwise than as the face of a certain meaning. Movement can be distinguished from meaning, although even reflex is a kind of accelerated reaction that comes from previous experiences with phenomena. Previous experience with phenomena gives meaning to the accelerated reaction. The speed of response overshadows, but cannot abolish, the meaning of the movement. ↩︎
22. Abernethy, B., Hanna, A., & Plooy, A. (2002). The attentional demands of preferred and non-preferred gait patterns. Gait & Posture, 15(3), 256-265. ↩︎