Spirit and Society

4.

The need is a sign that spreads throughout the entire archetypal representation, whatever its character. Therefore, necessity cannot force the instinct to extract the reminiscence structure from the subconscious. Aggression does not replace the drive, but rather intensifies it. The first fits into the currents of the latter, making it more terrifying and more attractive at the same time. If the subject succeeds in extracting the experience from the soul, aggression will merge with the vivid display of superiority. Since this does not happen, aggression is tied to the first thing that is related to its dynamic nature – the drive. The same applies to instinct. It cannot distribute the perfect development representatively. Therefore, it unites itself with the drive and aggression, meets them, and instead of encouraging the mind to act perfectly, it advances their course. Instead of channeling the impulses into the mind, so that the mind can use them for its own purpose, it returns the impulsive energy to the drive in order to strengthen its affective influence. The subject feels the influence of the instinct increasing, and becomes even more aggressive. He thinks that such a state will inevitably force the subconscious to give the image of the reminiscence experience. As both the dominant element of the drive and the dominant element of the inscenation¹, aggression has an external expression. But the subject can suppress aggression, although the inscenation, the drive, or both suddenly torment the soul indefinitely with their exaggerated affects. The subject can begin to shape an arbitrary inscenation with the help of intuition. He may also begin to draw out a suitable reminiscence in one way or another. This would mean that instinct enables the soul to establish a free and open relationship with what is emerging on the horizon. Moreover, it is irrelevant whether what emerges is built up gradually and specifically or rises suddenly over a certain period of time. How something surfaces depends on how instinct and soul cooperate. The drive primordially enables these processes, and aggression confirms them, even when it seems that nothing is going well for the subject. The subject falls in love with his own mental states. They inspire him to grasp the end of the apparent and the manifest. Well, the subject, figuratively speaking, pulls with all his strength, to see what will come out. We will explain how the “removal of content from the subconscious” takes place a little further down. Now, we are still dealing with the preparatory phase.

So, the subject experiences psychoid-impulsive-aggressive states. These experiences automatically move into consciousness and force it to start moving psychoidally in their style. Thus, psychoid events are born, this time seasoned with an aggressive mood. The aggressive mood is due to the subject being over-satisfied with what he has achieved so far in the psychomental sphere. The process thus far presents the image of the drive because the drive has established all internal relations. Everything that takes place in the soul is attributed to the drive. All the more does the drive prevail over everything else, because the representative sides of the soul are poorly highlighted and represented, although everything happens because of them. Its energies supervise all processes, it seems that they do not want the representative side to gain the upper hand, so that they can rule the soul sovereignly for much longer. Until representations take over from the drive, aggression will depend on the power of the drive, just as a physiological instinct depends on the innate rehabilitation mechanism of the organ and is subordinated to the class of functions inherent to it. In fact, while the drive rules, the instinct, at least potentially, tends towards the world of representations. Aggression is also a mood that, although it is related to the drive, exists because the subject is not clear about whether the process is stalling or proceeding in the right direction. The subject gets excited in the positive sense of the word, but at the same time it strains and ultimately experiences the unpleasant ambiguity. The contradiction suffocates him, and yet he endlessly hopes that he will succeed, because most of the path is already illuminated and awaits him to reach the goal. If he had a concrete inscenation before him, reminiscent, imagined or invented, the subject would adapt his aggression to it. More precisely, aggression would naturally and spontaneously flow into the world of the soul and would be integrated into it with the help of the inscenation, because the spirit of aggression is implied in advance in the vivid display of superiority. The inscenation would be aggressive in itself because demonstration of superiority is based on aggressive moods, even when they are absent from the soul. Just as demonstrating superiority can be a symbol of aggression, practical actions can symbolize an aggressive mood. This phase is not susceptible to such a situation. The subject only assumes what it means for him and his conditions.

Fortunately, the aggressive mood within the drive grows so much that it becomes a driving force. The drive excited the subject: it enabled him to adopt some progressive states and prepared him for others that he had yet to adopt. Such a state is the motor force of aggression. It accelerates psychoid experiences and condenses psychoid events. From this perspective, “aggression is not a “primary” instinct in the sense of classes of functions, but an unavoidable, innate and constantly operating instinct”². The physiological instinct had to submit to the integral organic mechanism and be distributed among its functions in order to enable them to proceed perfectly. Aggression, which becomes the driving force of psychic (or psychomental) processes, takes over psychic processes and forces their integral autopoietic function. It does not submit to mechanical homeostasis like the instinct of the organs, but takes the mechanism and forces it to get the best out of itself. It is no coincidence that some people are extremely shrewd in their opposition to the one who has angered them. The drive reaches its maximum but does not retreat. It remains the basic driving force of the psychoid whole which needs to be reshaped into a sadistic representation, a vivid memory, or a inscenated demonstration of superiority. But through the excitement it injects into the subject, it revives the psychic processes, establishes a thermodynamic balance on which the further development of the process and its potentials depends.

Aggression is also functionally limited. It is too crude to replace the function of instinct. When it forces psychomental processes, it forces instinct as well. It tries to make the perfect unwrapping as productive as possible. If the subject leaves aggression to itself and lacks the homeostatic role of drive and instinct, the established dynamic structures will break down because aggression will become too hasty. Drive tends to accelerate itself, it tries to abolish the limit of decent unwrapping. But the instinct is always there to reason, calm and prevent it. Aggression accelerates processes, but at the same time allows instinct to teach it how to deal with its own haste and impatience. Instinct nurtures aggression, as beauty is healing the beast. Drive and aggression are related in temperament but play two, although mostly complementary, different roles. One can even argue about the speed with which they fade away. Physiologically, drive and aggression are immortal and inexhaustible. These are forces of the organism that work silently, probably to the point of contradicting their expansive-explicit nature, and maintain it as long as it lives. But as psychic energies, drive and aggression depend entirely on the tangible aspects of power-flow. The more strongly the subject feels their differential power-flow, the more real they are in themselves. The identical properties of aggression do not make it a substrate of the drive, even though they merge into the tangible power-flow to the point of unrecognizability due to the identical properties. For example, the feeling of tension and excitement are common to both. Both are “subject to modification and variability because they can learn”³, but we consider them expendable depending on the circumstance. Even when they are physiologically resilient and conditionally immortal, they die out along with the aging organ. The contradictory existence in the bosom of weak power-flow is not as much of a challenge to reason as the entropy mentioned before.

Aggressive mood forces the subject to psycho-mentally focus on the archetypal representation of demonstrating superiority. For now, he sets up the basic constitutive sector: the abstract structure (of demonstrating superiority), although he obviously has it in mind. In the archetypal representation he automatically recognizes the archetypal ideal, i.e. the need. That is, he experiences sublimely the fundamental elements of practical narcissistic-dominance metaphysics contained in experience. The subject will extract the experience, but it will not be an original lower face-like image from the beginning. At first, it will be pseudo-figurative because it will anticipate the deep meaningful structures. The subject feels how close he is to the assumed lower face-like image, i.e. to the reminiscence experience. It blows over him like a fresh mountain wind. The subject will galvanize the aggressive mood. He would have translated it into a violent gesture of joy, if his behavior had not been hindered by the empty space. Aggression grows in amplitude, like any psychic energy that forces the organism to feel apoplectic, i.e. full of the need to act destructively. Whether it is an impulse, a drive, an urge, a will, any of these energies develop vertical power-flows. The subject needs to act horizontally in the environment, but the repressive energy grows in him contrary to the striving and the course of the motor mechanisms of the body. The subject strives for representative goals, and the drive mechanics themselves are adapted to such goals and exist for their sake. Therefore, aggression experiences an apoplectic shock (from apolepsy – stunting of organ function). Its power-flow is stunted before it is transformed into a violent physical act. But the power-flow does not decline. Before this happens, the subject empathizes with the pure-translucent experience; he even tentatively touches its low figurative substance. Empathy raises the aggressive mood. Its power-flow thickens so much that the subject cannot bear not to be physically violent, at least gesturally. In order not to waste his strength in vain, the subject renews the bodily ritual. He makes gestures of power to unite them with inner urges. His feelings are morbidly ambitendentious, in a biological-medical sense, diathetically negative. They disturb the nervous system and force the subject to withdraw in shame and neglect initiatives. The more one tries to extract experience, the more meaningless role the bodily rituals of creative aggression play.

Indeed, after withdrawing, the subject puts the fires of aggression under cover. He realizes that no matter how much he tries intentionally, he will not reproduce the experience. The subject and the aggressive moods retreat tactically, which means that their act is illusory. They cannot be subordinated and reduced to the processes below them; they must not die out (we are talking about the symbolic death of the subject) before they have fulfilled their task. Their role is transferent and they must fulfill it at all costs. They hide behind expectation and repressed nervous excitement. In fact, the entire system of drive driven retrievals of memories is withdrawn and lasts until one is born and a new experience erupts. The subject continues to wait for the experience to come to the surface. There is no way around it. The expectation is infected by the repressed nervous excitement. The repressed excitation of the nerves keeps in actio and as the deepest personal secret the subject’s discomfort. The negative diathesis⁴ is shifted to a lower, and therefore more subtle, level, and is modified, being neither positive nor negative. Previously, the subject’s proximity to the transcendent reminiscence experience had triggered aggression. aggression did not spill over because of the strong homeostatic role of instinct in the system of drive forces. Now, the subject expects the experience, but instead of his optimism being strengthened, the neurological excitement is intensified. The subject experiences an enormous transcendent discomfort hic et nunc, and behaves as if the prevailing feeling were a strong, but ordinary premonition. The less destructive and less negative weakens the influence of the more destructive and more negative. We will call this diathesis reductive. This is the structure of the state of withdrawal. While dealing with these conditions, the subject does not lose sight of aggression, and remembers well the values ​​of its vertical scale. Aggression wants to destroy expectations as quickly as possible. It creates mental nervousness and automatically excites the organism. Both conditions prevent aggression from transforming into an act of violence. Or if they do not resist it, they openly contradict its hasty aspirations.

5.

The subject nervously expects something to appear on the surface that will reflect the experience. He does this not only to keep the aggression in an apoleptic state, but also to open the way for new experiential dimensions. He knows exactly that the states of withdrawal that he has induced in himself will weaken the potential for amplitude development. In other words, the subject adjusts the aggressive mood as necessary to create the new transcendent experience. If he does not assemble a perfect structure from this set of psychic states, he will not try even a small part of what follows. Therefore, the subject objectively manages the disputed amplitude of aggression. Values ​​are not shaken and stand still, but the nervous soul easily plays with the power-flow that passes through them. “From a behavioral perspective, its variable manifestations are subject to measurement”,⁵ but the danger lies in uncontrolled variability, not in the possibility of constructing a scale of values. If the subject surrenders to aggression, it will take the situation into its own hands, turning power-flow into its own relative self-determination. Instead of instrumentalizing the field of power-flow, aggression will attribute the field to itself. It will rise to a substantial moment that predetermines all activities and outcomes. The subject prevents aggression from becoming “intentional” and self-diagnostic. He will be richly rewarded for not deviating from his own methodology, which he builds pragmatically: in step with his own impulses and their blind potentials.

Under the influence of the new structure of moods, the subject synthesizes the representation and the ideal. It creates a fluid reminiscence whole whose core is seen and experienced intensely. The reminiscence whole is purely translucent. It is a formless voluminous air that needs to be filled with content and given a quasi-geometric shape. Experience peeks out of the configuration of the translucent reminiscence whole and affects the subject. But affect appropriates and absorbs the structure, steals its pure translucent disorder. In its presence, experience is not above the reminiscence content and the reminiscence content is not above experience. It manipulates their dramatic clash, because they depend entirely on pure translucency. Experience as such is akin in nature to pure translucency. When the subject imagines the experience and tries to reproduce it, he assumes in consciousness purely translucent forms that must be harmonized with the content he extracts from the subconscious. But the reminiscence content is completely subordinate to the transcendental perspectives of extraction and existence. Affect appropriates the neutral position and character of the synthesized representation and the synthesized ideal. The subject stares at the affect, tries through it to penetrate the nature of the clash between experience and reminiscence content. Experience, at this moment, opposes the reminiscence content. It may refer to it, but it need not. It draws the spirit of pure translucency from its forms and can adapt it to other subconscious and transcendent predispositions.

Affect helps the reminiscence content to bind experience to itself. While affect captivates the subject, experience remains within the subconscious reminiscence content. Affect reduces the coefficient of dramatic conflict between experience and reminiscence. But affect has nothing in common with subjectivity. It helps it, but is instrumentally too distant from it to treat it as its own. Introjective treatment is out of the question. Neither side of the conflict plays a strictly positive role. Reminiscence hides in the subconscious, it inhibits the development of representation. Experience threatens to disperse into multiple perspectives that are alien to reminiscence. Therefore, affect does not care which side in the conflict it represents, as long as both adhere to the potentials of the convergent result. Archetypal representation suffers from both equally. Only difference is that experience disrupts the desired process more deeply than reminiscence. Reminiscence is based on a one-dimensional motif. This saves it from the dispersive tendencies of experience. Affect takes over this integral state of affairs and tries to reshape it and direct it in the right direction.

The subject gazes into the affect and allows it to take over his soul. The subject becomes exalted and strongly longs to participate in the resolution of their conflict. Ecstasy tenses him, and this allows him to have insight into the tense state of the conflict, to empathize with it and to understand it from within. The whole soul of the subject is solidarized and surrendered to the affect. After that, the subject penetrates easily and spontaneously into the heart of the conflict. If affect controlled the difference between experience and reminiscence by controlling the conflict, the subject is disposed to become capable of articulating relations from within and ultimately reducing the conflict. Thanks to the affect, the subject encounters correlates that have established a balance. Objects are adapted to their order. The order stands firm because of their adaptation. It is an order of absolute potentiality. Objects are not functional entities that do work, but transcendent nuclei that have to develop their pure unity into a symbolically transparent and concrete structure.

Affect reveals to the subject the secrets of a wondrous perspective. The structure of reminiscent relations and ratios, derives from subjectivity. But affect pulls it outwards. Even though both structure and affect are projections of subjectivity, they are externalized. By that very fact, they paradoxically become independent. They are like dreams, only they occur in a state of ecstasy. The subject is awake but is distracted by the objectified projections that have not ceased to arise from subjectivity. They take place in the soul, but the ecstasy forces the subject to see them as if they were all around him. Even when he experiences them as if they were all around him, he fixes himself on one point and gathers them in it, despite the fact that they do not cease to be externally comprehensive. It is similar in a dream. Only then does the natural environment fade away. The subject completely burrows into the soul and inside it as in a water world. He walks along the surrounding projections that complement and replace each other, and lives in them. While walking, he produces them and while living them, he changes them. In both cases, the projections acquire independence and impose themselves on the exterior that surrounds the subject. We have previously discussed a similar state involving longing and daydreaming. And then, the subject focuses on one point, projects the desired thing, and absorbs it in the affectivity that the desired thing originally represents. But the state of longing and the state of extracting the content from the subconscious, that is, from the memory, have two different affective points. While longing for what he dreams, the subject leans slightly towards the content. But he is also so blind and engrossed that he does not notice that he is slowly and surely sinking into its elusive abyss. While trying to extract the reminiscence from memory, the subject clings tenaciously to the affect and jumps into it, fully aware of the operational challenges. However, the modified repetition reminded the subject that he was walking along the only track of a daydream that could not wait to see its own content.

The subject is confronted with the initial homeostasis into which experience and reminiscence have fallen under the influence of affect. They are no longer opposed “objects,” although one can see that they are rubbing against each other antagonistically. Their order will begin to differentiate within itself once they have reached a final and comprehensive agreement. However resentful the experience may be, it will have to be tempered by the fact that the subject will identify it at once after extracting the reminiscence content. Its sole function in this case is to set formal frames for pure translucency; to show that its content will not be based on perspectives to which distant and almost unrecognizable experiences are related. The field of memories specifies the formal framework. Therefore, it plays a more important role than experience. And yet, not everything is as it seems. Experience also has an immanent advantage, which reflects gradual processes. In order to suddenly discover the character and face of the demonstrated superiority, the subject will have to imagine experientially all existential segments that coincide with its abstract constitution. For example, the narcissistic-dominance mood is shaped in accordance with the general constitution of demonstrating superiority. The subject appeals to experience in order to remember an existential model that unites the two above-mentioned correlates. Later, we will see that the sudden extraction of a harmonious whole from segments is not alien to evocative processes. Reminiscence precedes experience in the order of functional preferences. But their functions are immanent, operating even before the subject extracts the content. Тhey are equated from the perspective of operational needs. In this respect, function is the place that an entity occupies in the hierarchy of operational possibilities. The operation, in turn, is an opportunity to act formatively, i.e. structurally towards a certain goal. It often equates itself with other operational entities and relativizes their initial position. In doing so, it neutralizes the functional preference of other entities. Therefore, the objective order of preferences does not undermine the possibility of their starting order being consolidated and developed.

These insights of the subject into the structure of the conflict bring him closer to the structure itself, encourage him to reconcile it, strengthen it and develop its obvious potentials. Affect is increasingly rooted in subjectivity. The soul and the potential reminiscence structure are united and identified. That which arose from the being of the subject, and remained conditionally bound to it, now returns to it and is equated with it⁶.

The attempt to extract memory and experience from the subconscious differs from the intuitive shaping of the face-like image. Now, the subject does not occupy the transcendent field and does not narrow the circle around it. He breaks through the dense fogs of the subconscious to extract the desired inscenation. Affect has stolen the pure translucent structure of reminiscence and experiential relations. Its piercing quality dominates the subject’s attention. It overshadows all potential concreteness that could arise from the purely translucent form. But what it steals it returns to the subject and enriches its essence a hundredfold. The purely translucent relation of experience and memory is a sub-contextual event. It is a dynamic sub-form of the representation of the demonstration of superiority which is based on the ideal need. The abstract structure of the demonstration of superiority is part of the total dispositional representation. The ideal need sublimates the total representation of the demonstration of superiority and its abstract structure. All together they predetermine the class of standard dispositional situations. They are therefore archetypal. The subject will unpack these structural relations. To do this, he had to immerse himself in the affective quality of the representation of the relationship between experience and reminiscence content. Affect did not occur before the ratio representation. The subject is immersed in the point at which he will imagine them and from which his fictitious aspirations will begin to spread. But this starting situation is not affective enough to say that the subject surrenders to affect. The subject forms the representation, so that it receives and gives itself to the outgoing affective energies in a measured manner. Ratio has an affective basis. Therefore, the daydreaming to which the subject indulges in this case is not purely mental, but psychomental. Once the subject feels that the representation has been formed, the affect emerges from the representation, forgets about subjectivity, and thickens. It draws with it and gathers within itself all the representational potentials. The subject anticipates more what it means for experience and reminiscence to enter into a dynamic relationship and feels more how they interact than he creates an idea of ​​their relationship. Despite this, the representational nature of the experience prevails over the intuitive, emotional, and instinctive one.

Representation outruns the affect. It appears almost reflexively and lasts reflectively to awaken the affect. It helps affect to become independent by the very fact that it has affective potential. In fact, representation robs subjectivity of its affect once subjectivity begins to seriously experience the representation. The subject receives the spirit of the representation, experiences it strongly in a reflective manner, and almost suddenly begins to empathize with it. The reflective moment is a kind of act of cold empathy. He empathizes with the representation as if it were a mental affect, despite the fact that the psychoenergetic sphere is more engaged in capturing the phenomenology of the experiential-reminiscent relationship. The subject comes to the affect by bypassing its content. He must first empathize with the detached affect as such, in order to penetrate the depths of the representation. After that, having firmly connected with the affect, the subject experiences all the internal stages of the relation. He experiences the clash of correlates, or objects; the phase of their balancing and the phase of their operational reconciliation. The subject does not emotionally evaluate internal events. Even before he connected with the affect, he had complete confidence in its projective qualities. If we go back even further, the representation also attracted and conquered the subject a priori. By the very fact that the subject has gone deeper, he has shown that there is no turning back and that he is ready to go all the way, no matter where the imagination takes him. The representation of the relation does not represent the relation until the affect takes over. However, it prepares the ground for the pragmatic unity between the subject and the affect. The subject outruns both representation and affect by becoming disposed in a manner characteristic of the state he wishes to invoke. They do not awaken an optimistic mood, but are part of his comprehensive and far-sighted initiatives even before they are formed.

6.

The subject is in the mood for reminiscent daydreaming. In this, he is supported by instinctual excitement. Affective representation is an extension of instinct. Intuition appears on the psychic scene whenever the subject strives to find something new in the old; or when he strives for something completely new, regardless of whether the new is supported by specific associative contents or not. Instinct does not expose itself to such luxury. It arises and works wherever there is a pre-determined path. Such ready-made products are offered by the field of memory. Although it can take many forms and represent various processes, the famous proverb bis vincit qui se vincit doe⁷s not apply to it. It cannot defeat itself, no matter how many skins it sheds. In this sense, drive is part of the instinct that adheres to the basic rules of mapped manifestation. The drive appears only in situations that it knows in advance will be constituted in a predetermined way. In contrast to them, intuition always treads on territory that is not known to it in order to extract the best from it. Its essence is to run into identical challenges. It is directed towards transcendental contents that promise the deepest dramatic outcomes, contain the most exciting unknown landscapes.

Every memory awakens instinctively, except for the memory communicated to us by others. But it also leaves a psychotic impression. Intuition participates in it as much as we want the psychic forces that create it to acquire a deeper meaning. Even without it, the subject opens up further the experiential-reminiscent horizon. He formally frames the representation of demonstrating superiority and repeats the outcome by closing the ring around the transcendent field. Now, there is a fluid, pure translucent representation at the center of which is the abstract structure of demonstrating superiority. He has all the conditions to be able to penetrate the abstract structure because it is the only thing that contains concrete contours. The subject repeats the ritual of infection with the independent affect in order to introject the experiential-reminiscent relation in himself. By doing so, he intuitively extracts data about the abstract structure. He does not produce its existential image, but increasingly perceives its concrete perspectives. He reconsolidates the relation over and over again, creating an atmosphere of controlled stimulus, to enable the standard experiences to reject the negative noises. The new pure experience with the relation encourages him to reproduce and repeat the relation as such more confidently. Thus, the subject receives clear information about his own progress, and the reconsolidation of the relationship helps him systematically to eradicate the tense state of affairs. In truth, the reconsolidated ratio adapts the subject more and more to the abstract structure, and less and less to the representation in genere. He begins to consider the representation as general noise. It increasingly cuts off the periphery to reach the pure core and preserve it for future endeavors. Experience is preoccupied with abstract structure. The reminiscence potential is reconciled with the comprehensive and versatile pruning of the representation. They play the role of the hippocampal cannabinoid system⁸. It, like them, gets the best out of a stereotypical memory that repeats itself cyclically, to enhance future memories associated with similar content. Memory can only be improved if it is reproduced frequently. This helps the subject to easily and effectively deal with situations that force him to repeat the reminiscent activities. The reconsolidation that takes place on the basis of improvement eradicates the negative experience that sabotages the subject’s actions in the world. This is a type of pure psychomental self-exposure.

The subject is getting closer to the goal. He has the basic ingredients of the abstract structure. He reconsolidates them by arranging them in the correct order; he solidifies their chaotically presented configuration. Now, the display of superiority represents a systematic posture to which the subject adapts even before appearing in the operational field. He must place himself in a superior position and confirm it with his posture of dominance. For this symbolic gesture to become visible, the subject must also be in appropriate mood. Finally, the subject will operate symbolically by not allowing anything to disturb his position and attitude. If he succeeds in this, he will deal a death blow to all the dangers and enemies who have accepted the logic of microscopic competition by demonstrating their own positional superiority. This is what the consolidated abstract structure looks like. These rules of conduct refute Locke’s thesis that substantial ideas are archetypes that are completely dependent on the existential image of things⁹. According to him, archetypal scenes from reality and fantasy cannot be abstracted like geometric figures. If the archetype cannot be abstracted geometrically and imagined as a perfect figure, it does not even have a constitution independent of reality. The figure must have a structure relatively identical to real forms. But what makes it independent of reality and representable in the soul is its perfect form. An archetype independent of reality is not even the grammatical construction that reproduces real experience in another language. Of course, these restrictions are absurd and unacceptable. Any structure that can be derived from rules that constitute it and refers to several related representations is archetypal. And more than that: pure phenomenological experience of archetypes convincingly shows how it transforms itself into a perfect general figure that compensates the geometric one. The abstract structure of superiority demonstration is an example of an archetypal structure derived from rules. The relationship between pure memory and pure experience, in turn, embodies the phenomenological side of archetypal representation that liberates substantial ideas from the shackles of reality.

The subject experiences an intensely consolidated abstract structure. He fully knows the normative identity of superiority demonstration. But each of the intelligible senses multiplies each element of the structure separately and uses it to encompass it from all sides. It breaks down the form of identity in order to better understand the potentials of embodiment¹⁰. This procedure, besides being justifiable from a philosophical point of view, can be found in the archives of psychiatric analysis:

“This model of perception is said to be richly revealing of the world. This is because the hierarchical generative model is predictive, detailed, and articulated; it is a model composed of a complete set of “hidden” reasons that are related to the organism. To satisfy the high content of perception does not mean simply recognizing the object, but rather that satisfaction involves a rich simulation of the perceived object. In other words, the perception of any object observed by complex beings like us also requires us to locate the object in a vast array of beliefs and states that have some connection with that same object. This includes predictions and interpretations about how the object might move and change through the possible cooperation that the organism establishes with it. This model brings beliefs and perceptions closely together. It also links tenacious varieties of distorted perception that alter belief structures that can produce delusions and hallucinations”¹¹.

The subject does not spoil the unity of the total representation and the ideal by imagining the abstract structure in detail. He deduces the representation to an abstract structure, in order to induce the abstract structure through the intelligible senses. The object of interest is not mixed, although in the abstract structure social narcissistic-dominance movements, tensions and conflicts are visible. The subject will return to the “big picture”. The face of local perspective will not weaken the subject’s psychological interest in the overall subject. For now, pure phenomenological operations introduce the subject into a new phase state. After tasting with the intelligible senses the shattered form of identity, the subject feels that he is just a little short of touching the primordial memory. Reminiscent experiences thicken to the point of being transformed into a deep retentive impression. In a similar way, the subject experiences the substantial nature of the image whenever it absorbs its semantic potential in deep imagination. He feels himself permeated by what is most his and at the same time grasps it like a slippery object that threatens to escape. The consolidated abstract structure and the reminiscence-retentive experiences support each other. The structure evolves from within without visible consequences, changes secretly, escapes from itself seemingly and returns to the original phenomenon-without-appearance unnoticed. Normative identity has no appearance, other than grammatical constructions that line up next to each other, one after the other, and one below the other. It facilitates the latent self-correlation and conceals the internal and seemingly unreal, restitutive transformations. Abstract structure requires the subject to embody and implement the normative identity. This means that the subject builds a social identity composed and supported by the rules of initial dispositional behavior. It is also the initial phenomenon-with-appearance of the demonstration of superiority. All normative stages form series of transformations of the abstract structure. Restitutive transformations are apparent from the perspective of the abstract structure, since it transforms actions into immanent steps. Each immanent step transforms, read: in its own way spiritualizes, the step before it. Accordingly, there is a causal and a general transformation; the latter arises from the former. In the end, the display of supremacy is either restituted in toto, seemingly in itself, or it is restituted completely and really with the help of the subject who will embody its transformations and transform himself. These are frameworks of autocorrelation dynamics¹². They have two layers, real and apparent, just as they had two streams: causal and general.

Primordial memory will contain the total representation and the embodied demonstration of superiority. The total representation will include the antagonists and their behaviors. Embodied demonstration of superiority will bring normative identity to life. Demonstration of superiority as such always correlates with a certain environment that opposes the subject and with which the subject enters into a dispositional conflict. It always provides its own antagonistic environment. Thus, the attempt to demonstrate subjective superiority enters the representation. It is joined by a multitude of identical antagonistic attempts. A core, that is, the dynamics of dispositional relations characterizes the entire representative and real process. Some attempts fail and become alienated from the self-identical core and are distorted until all trace of them is lost. Their downfall and their rise also change the balance in the self-identical core. The representation is an extreme. It is extremely similar and not entirely identical to the subjective perspective of the core (of demonstrating superiority). The basic abstract pattern applies to all opposing sides; it conditions and shapes all dispositional attempts. The core and its subjective perspective are predominantly identical to the entire representation. Each opponent follows their own autocorrelative framework. Everyone emulates the dispositional perspectives inherent in his character and conditioned by current value-personal dynamics and position in the world.

The subject must build a position that will elevate him above all other attempts and ruin them. His autocorrelative frame must contain a self that will prevail over the dispositional properties of the other’s behavior. Every opponent invokes, or rather will invoke, a self that he considers decisive in the struggle for positional supremacy. These prominent selves are arsenal in every autocorrelative framework. Together with the core of demonstrating superiority, they form a common, independent union. The one who prevails will become aware that he prevails because he will visibly shake the attitude of his opponent. This means that he holds himself so well that he allows the exceptional self to radiate from him and dazzle others. Superiority radiates so refined and unwavering that we do not know where περιθάνεια begins and where primitive pride ends. The exceptional self encourages the subject to defeat others without changing the initial attitude and without changing the general dispositional state that he himself manifests. The exceptional self which allows the subject not to change the relationship to the other with identical aspirations and not to enter into open conflict with him, but to subjugate him quietly and subtly due to an initial dispositional difference, has its own name. It is an exponent of the law of power¹³. It is not an ordinary property like traits, habits, physical shape of the body, professional abilities, etc. It is rather a value feature that drastically separates the subject from the opponents. It is enough for the subject to remember what value feature it is, for the exceptional self to begin to move and set in motion the autocorrelative dynamics. It fits in advance within the framework of the autocorrelative system; it encourages autocorrelative involution; it delights the relations between the products of internal transformation and forces the subject to intimately rethink their relations. The exponent of the power law is main engine of autocorrelation. With its help, the subject removes the negative manifestations of the normative identity. It carries out a negative selection on everything that distorts the starting frames. The core, that is, the necessity to demonstrate superiority, is not a bottom that the subject should avoid. The dynamics must make constant sacrifices to the core for the dispositional attempt to succeed.

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1. The abstract structure of demonstrating superiority cannot be called a inscenation, because it cannot be represented vividly. Therefore, it is a mere representation. But demonstration of superiority that manifests itself reminiscently is an inscenation and a representation at the same time. It is a representation because semantic conclusions can be drawn from it. ↩︎
2. Jaffe, D. S. (1982). Aggression: Instinct, drive, behavior. ↩︎
3. Ibid. ↩︎
4. The diathesis is negative when the negative correlate increases at the expense of the positive correlate. ↩︎
5. Ibid. ↩︎
6. Prouty, G. (2004). The hallucination as the unconscious self. Journal of the American Academy of Psychoanalysis and Dynamic Psychiatry, 32(4), pp. 597- 612. ↩︎
7. He who defeats himself is a double winner. ↩︎
8. de Oliveira Alvares, L., Genro, B. P., Diehl, F., Molina, V. A., & Quillfeldt, J. A. (2008). Opposite action of hippocampal CB1 receptors in memory reconsolidation and extinction. Neuroscience, 154(4), pp. 1652-1654. ↩︎
9. Локк Д., Опыт о человеческом разумении, Азбука-классика, Санкт-Петербург, 2022, с. 662-670. ↩︎
10. Delez Ž., Razlika i ponavljanje, Fedon, Beograd, 2009, s. 221-223. ↩︎
11. Ines Hipolito, Jorge Goncalves, Joao G. Pereira, Schizophrenia and common sense: explaining the relation between madness and social values, Springer, studies in brain and mind 12, Switzerland, 2018, pp. 128. ↩︎
12. Northoff, G., Sandsten, K. E., Nordgaard, J., Kjaer, T. W., & Parnas, J. (2021). The self and its prolonged intrinsic neural timescale in schizophrenia. Schizophrenia bulletin, 47(1), 170-179. ↩︎
13. Ibid. ↩︎