(EXCERPT FROM DISPOZITIONAL ROLE)
1.
The psychoid forms of establishing a relationship with the representation of the need that have to shape itself emphasize the drive and its universal function. The more strongly the subject empathizes with the representation of the need, regardless of the degree of its formation, the more strongly and convincingly the subject feels that the drive is the energetic totality of the need and, at the same time, that it is its unconditional energetic potential. In other words, as the subject empathizes catechically and psychoidally with the relative representation, it is filled with drive forces more than before. They occupy him with an unusual force, although, as we have said, the drive has withdrawn to exercise the primary function. Psychoid events and experiences impregnate the drive with emotions of greatness. It is no longer a simple energy that grows suddenly and moves rapidly upwards. The drive adapts to the duration required to form a representation of the need. The subject does not place himself at an emotional and reflexive distance from the need and the representation that “simmers”, but on the contrary instrumentalizes the drive. It can be said that the drive becomes a component of instinctive actions that allow for the formation of a perfect representation. The drive fits into more complex processes, just as the arch of physiological reflexes develops into a basic mechanism of the existential challenges faced by a person who has set out in search of his own value1.
The only basis on which it is justifiable to say that the subject withdraws from need and its representations is that the drive is a blind energy whose technical influence prevails over the process. But again, the impression of the subject that he is forming a representation is much stronger than the influence of the drive and the impressions it leaves. The formative impression is fed by the surplus energy amounts of the drive. Therefore, the subject cannot imagine the need, if he does not encourage this apparent negative distance that the drive imposes between the subject and the process. Without this apparent separation of the subject from the process, the need cannot come to expression, and the representation will not gather the drive energy necessary to realize its form. It seems that at every convenient opportunity we belittle the need. Apparently, the need depends extremely on the drive, and the drive never depends on the need. But there must be a balance that will save the aspiration of vulnerable narcissism from transforming into grandiose narcissism. Without this balance, the subject does not believe that he will achieve the desired results. Sartre, saw that need by nature strives for its own independence. “Need,” he says, “sets itself up for itself and totalizes its function; it strives to turn into a gesture, it tries to function for itself, and not in unity with organic life”2. We have latently shown, but so far we have not publicly indicated, how, that is, through what the need begins to overcome the drive in value. The need takes precedence over the experience of showing personal superiority3 which the subject tries to push out of the subconscious. It lies at its foundations, but precisely for this reason it has the advantage. Experience presents itself, it must find support in ideal modifications. Need is the pure core of ideal modifications. Drive, on the contrary, overcame need. Like a brute force, it encouraged its airy aspirations as much as it benefited from them to grow and torment the subject. The more the need rests on representational potentials, the more decisively it resists the uncontrollable outbursts of drive that encapsulate it. Need tends to entrap the drive in its aspirations even when drive and need follow the same path under the guidance of the subject who desires the goal that both reflect. However, the need sets a path, different from the contents of the representable experience. The subject, at least while seeking the experience, does not need to represent it to himself in order to repeat it. He transforms the experience into an object of need, in order to build a perfect image of himself and his dispositional life. Perhaps the subject will wish to repeat the experience to give soul to the pursuit of shaping an ideal face-like image? We shall see. For now, the situation is as it is. The saga of need begins here. But this dynamic predisposition also marks the beginning of its acquisition of relative independence from drive.
Need is the general sense of a certain class of actions. Demonstration of superiority is an intentional field that limits possible subjective actions. The need establishes a normative framework: it tells the subject which actions to accept and develop, and which to reject and place in another class. The demonstration of superiority, on the other hand, symbolizes the actions in the class, shows which actions belong to the class and which are inappropriate for it4. The mode of behavior (which, if concretized, turns into a model) and the need move towards each other and meet somewhere in the middle. Thus, they form an ideal pattern. The very cooperation of the need and the representations that it classifies in accordance with the universal type of action suppress the drive. The subject is not so much concerned with it as he is focused on his own projections. The drive is constantly working at full speed, it is a motor background against which the lucid and exaggerated ego-journeys of the subject are reflected. Nevertheless, attention conceals and dulls its obvious influence. The drive does not teach the need how to function for itself. It is an egoic energy that seeks to realize its own needs through the general need. After the state of affairs changed, and psychoid events and experiences began to bear fruit, the drive submitted to the need and channeled its energies not to satisfy itself, but to realize its desires. Instinctive turmoil is also reshaped in accordance with the state of affairs and has acquired a new orientational dynamic. Instinct is a form of productive activity to which the evolutionary and Machiavellian law applies most directly: the end justifies the means. From the perspective of the course it is supposed to reverse, the instinct hides other social-Darwinian surprises. The end not only justifies the means, but the end also justifies changing the end, if the old end is worn out, diminished, and overshadowed by another greater and therefore more worthy end. Social and technical development is based on such Darwinian regularity. So, whatever priorities the subject advocates, instinct will regulate their functional synthesis. Accordingly, instinct also breaks away from the drive, although it is indebted to it for its own existence. Instinct restructures intentional formations. It submits to the aspirations of need. It himself strives (mentally) to embody the models of the need that is being realized here and now; wants to help the need’s gesture and content float to the surface. Ritual gestures of the body, and even behavior as a ritual act, are elementary manifestations of the need to form an face-like image, and in the long run, to dominate. They are distant echoes of the need to act dispositionally on every occasion.
Drive is the rousing psychic energy par excellence. The need groups mental perspectives (using the type of experience) and governs their direction (coordinates them). Instinct regulates the relations in order to achieve a procedural balance. These three psychic manifestations are synchronized in a new way. After this, the subject continues to form the representation. It is necessary to emphasize that in this case, by the formation of a representation we mean the experience that the subject draws from the subconscious hic et nunc. The representational content exists in advance and at once. He tries to bring it back to the surface, so that the process of return is experienced as a reassembly of scattered parts. The subject knows that once he has touched the edge of the experience and pulled it back, it will suddenly appear in all its retentive rigidity. And yet, until he has extracted the experience, he will feel that he is putting its parts together, even though there are no parts because he has no idea of the concrete content of the experience5. The apparent recollection in the absence of the representation as such is called the reminiscence formation of the experience. Retention can also occur earlier than anticipated. The subject, most often under the influence of the strong work of instinct, drive and need, has the feeling that he has seized the experience and holds it firmly in his hands only because he knows its standard assumptions. In this way, the subject self-consciously harnesses the psychic forces and participates in the process with the other agents. The general synchrony significantly enhances the reminiscent, and as a consequence, the retentive process.
The self-conscious participation6 of the subject in the process of retrieving the experience sheds new light on the nature of the need. The need predetermines the rational contents of the instinct. It is composed of a general scheme which the subject must either inscenate or implement by action the intelligible normative instruction. The drive is a whirlwind movement. It animates combinations that arise from things that come into contact with each other in its currents. The latter reveals the principle of the psychoid unfolding. The subject experiences what is happening and intervenes in the event in order to survive it.
Self-awareness plunges into the psychomental storm and begins to separate the meaningful pure things from the insignificant same things. The need for instructions for carrying out a series of classified procedures that apply to any similar occasion is transformed into a pure experimental scheme. It includes a certain series of classified procedures that apply to an exceptional occasion related to them. Thus, the instinct acquires a detailed picture of the protential things7 abandons the general one. The procedures belong to a certain class precisely because they must be bound, constituted and applied in limited occasions. The type of occasion determines which of the classified actions will stand out and form an experimental scheme. And vice versa: what configuration will be established by the actions classified according to the need, such a formation will be provided by the occasion. According to this, the instinct receives a predetermined situation filled with actions that constitute its whole. The need is also a gesture, because the subject must bodily conform to the experimental scheme; both to form it and to experience it. The experimental schema actualizes the need, by embodying in the event the demonstration of superiority. Since the schemas of need, both general and experimental8, are rooted in past experience, the creative potential they suggest has a symbolic function. Just as the return occurred as an apparent re-composition, the experimental embodiment of need occurs as an apparent creation of a new representation. Ambiguous affective states are a hook on which restless experience should be caught.
2.
The subject is confronted for the first time with a pure archetypal representation. In its substratum, psychoenergetic (drive, reflex, instinct and urge) and psychomental (need, reflection, will, action) forces are at work. But its emergence is due to the synthesis that the need and the demonstration of superiority realize. We have said that need is a pure archetypal ideal because it encapsulates and condenses classified instructions that form a certain type of occasion. This is, in fact, the basic definition of an archetype. The demonstration of superiority is a dynamic form of its archetypal constitution. It represents the general and experimental pattern of the need. The subject can imagine how he shows his superiority in four ways. Two ways are identified with the general pattern. He takes one example, elevates it above the rest, that is, turns it into the highest possible face-like image. He excludes other representations that have equal, and perhaps greater, value potential than the chosen pattern. The occasion inherent in the pattern and the actions that constitute it most strongly enchant the subject’s being. Therefore, the most valuable objective potential has no real objective value. The pattern is transformed into a general scheme by segregating the remaining representations. The subject may act differently without violating the principles of creating a general pattern. He can imagine an abstract action in an abstract occasion, unite them into an archetypal whole, and experience them as a general pattern of the impulsive need. This is not enough to satisfy the appetites of self-affection. Therefore, he moves into the sphere of experimental schematization. The subject combines several actions of the same class to modify the summary occasion. This is a third way of representing the need to demonstrate superiority. If this is not enough for the subject and does not satisfy him, then he takes complete formations of demonstrating superiority along with their occasions and crosses them with other related synthetic occasions and actions. While working gradationally-schematically, the subject more clearly distinguishes the archetypal ideal.
The subject has one concreteness: the conditional superiority that he has demonstrated in the sequential and in the signaling face-like image. He also possesses a phantom value: the pure need that he desires ardently because he has examples of concrete demonstration of personal superiority. The experience of superiority has awakened the psychoenergetic forces because the subject is hungry for more. Apart from this, the subject still has nothing concrete that should mark the “face-like image of a new generation”. He still has abstractions and psychic energies at his disposal, although he has concrete and convincing experiences from the recent past in stock. The subject has gone through a whole procedure in the field of intuition, only to understand that he has to turn to the drive which alone can draw out from the subconscious a powerful memory. Because of this, the experimental and general treatment of need takes place in the spirit of apparent restructuring. The subject thinks that he is creating a pattern for the need and that by doing so he is shaping the necessary face-like image, but he is only simulating the creative processes. In fact, he anticipates them more than he simulates them. The subject foreshadows the imagined face-like image and is inspired to draw out the old potentially effective experience.
The whole constellation of useful states and favorable affects reinforces the pure representation of demonstrating superiority. Demonstration of superiority is in itself a pure complex of actions that signifies the need. It has no primordial structure. It is also a potential that directs the imagination towards certain primordial characteristics. Such characteristics are the following: orientation towards antagonistic otherness, operational actions of domination, moods and psychic states that move the organism to act, etc. The pure complex frames the potential of primordial possibilities. The occasions condition the way in which the universal action unfolds and manifests. The pure complex is a summary pattern that presupposes the individual manifestations of the universal action. The experimental scheme, on the other hand, can encompass multiple complexes of demonstrating superiority. It does not coincide with just one complex manifestation, nor with just one complex network of related manifestations. It includes as many complexes as it can compartmentalize the event composed of related actions. In doing so, the event must be teleologically predetermined. The experimental pattern can be reduced to a general one if the compartmental structure of the event has the power to sublimate itself to a pattern that the subject can experience both as a systematic whole and as a homogeneous entity. Combinations are endless. The experimental scheme always represents one or more imagined and fictional dispositional actions. The imagined dispositional actions are related to the specific possibilities and aspirations of the subject. Fictional dispositional actions, on the other hand, rely entirely on daydreams that are detached from any real initiative of the subject. In fact, the subject strives to invent a quintessential image, so that he will arrive at it through a gradation of multiple face-like images that he thinks over again. n fact, the subject strives to invent a quintessential image, so that he will arrive at it through a gradation of multiple images that he thinks over again. He imagines the experience in order to advance and independent the processes of acquiring experience related to the first experience. Patterns homogenize fragmented actions and place them in a coherent story. An experimental pattern may contain one dispositional action. But if it is creative, it appeals to the subject, and the subject has never tried it in reality, then its seemingly general nature is built on the basis of experimental endeavors. The complex is composed of a series of dispositional actions inherent in a single occasion. This relatively complex and relatively large scale is treated as a pattern, just as individual and independent action is also treated as a pattern. If the action arises from real experience, i.e. the former imitates the latter in the mental sphere, then it is general but cannot be experimental. More such complexes complicate the pattern, regardless of whether they are woven from fictional, imagined or reminiscent actions. The general pattern cannot be experimental only if the actions contained in it absolutely correlate with the experience. But actions from experience can be modified according to the needs of phantasy. Thus, although they belong to the experience in advance, the subject imagines them anew in order to compose from them an invented dispositional behavioral model. In that case, the reminiscent actions obviously fit into a new, previously unexperienced pattern or complex, so apart from being general, they are also called experimental. Any complex can become general. Experimental complexes are those whose events are schematized in contradiction to the original configuration of experience, even though they steal segments from it.
The subject knows his own need, because he knows what he wants to achieve. But he still doesn’t know how to achieve the realization. Types of general schemes, modes of dispositional action, scope of events involving dispositional initiatives are elements of the archetypal representation in which the need and essence of dispositional action are sublimated. The demonstration of superiority encompasses all local dispositional initiatives. That is their ultimate goal. Local dispositional actions carry the spirit of supremacy that wants to constantly show itself to the world, but they stray from the path to provide the subject immortal self-satisfaction. Local actions in the complex, or if you prefer in the event of dispositional acts, or if you prefer otherwise, the pattern composed of purposeful dispositional activities, are like physiological instincts. he dynamic mechanisms of the latter grow together with the structures of the organs to help them routinely rehabilitate themselves9.
The subject cannot embody the archetypal representation for several reasons. He cannot invent an event where he will behave dispositionally from the very beginning of his appearance in the designated place, because he is in the lower stages of the psychomental revolution of the face-like image. Then, he tries to extract an event from the subconscious that will embody the original experience and his already-lived dispositional complexes. It is easy for him to mechanically imagine an event within the framework of which his behavior will bring fear and horror into the hearts of the people present. But the images from which the event is woven will not be substantialized and become figurative. They will not build on the hierarchy of attempts to shape a perfect image whose value will be built from the partial meanings of complementary, partially successful and locally original lower face-like images. If he thinks that he will repeat the machinally invented image, and thereby fill it with substance, he is horribly deceiving himself. Experimental instructions are not just the consequence of serious architectural undertakings. They are not ready-made staged and normative schemes. They are the very operations, the dynamics that take on a character while causally comparing the lower face-like images. It is the face of convolution of face-like images. As the subject jumps from one lower face-like image to another, he withdraws the skipped lower face-like images from the whole. He does not take them out of the sequence, he does not subtract them in order to reject them. The subject binds them in a suggestive retentive assembly. They testify to the power of the final complex of substantial scenic representations while being chaotically sublimated. The lower face-like images cooperate with each other just as physiological instincts and local dispositional actions do. They cannot be separated from the constitutive whole, despite the fact that they play separate roles. Instinct cannot be freed from the integral biological mechanism. The lower face-like images cannot become independent and take over the role of the perfect face-like image. Local dispositional action must be taken into account before the necessity of demonstrating superiority. Their separate roles are transoccasional: however far they may stray from the synthetic vision, their activity solidifies and advances the constellation of purposes they are implementing and striving towards.
The demonstration of superiority has a constellation of elements inherent only to it. But the demonstration of superiority also hands over the function of the elements to local actions. And they should show a certain mood, emphasize certain inclinations, behave in accordance with operational tasks, take into account what they are facing, etc. The event is composed of complex patterns of dispositional behavior. Accordingly, the event is complex(ed). It can also be schematically depicted. Actions are abstracted into normative guidelines, and at the same time embodied in a specific inscenation. The latter emphasizes the schematic nature of the event. Such is the general picture of the nature of demonstrating superiority. The subject assumes the specific experimental outcomes. He wonders which point in the event to generalize and declare as the quintessential moment. While holding this picture of things in mind, the subject feels that the demonstration of superiority has a general pattern. It outlines the basic trajectories of development, but says nothing about the specific outcomes.
The demonstration of superiority through the prism of the general scheme is a purely translucent and universal functional structure. He feels that he must either experiment and invent an event that will become an image, or he must appeal to experience to extract an event that he previously experienced as a lower face-like image. If he experiments, he will devise a pattern of dispositional behavior. Before that, he will take into account the scope of actions and the size of the operational space. He will dimension the event so that it will not be too extensive, thus not leaving a perfect impression of generalization. Moreover, the event must not be rearranged so as not to disrupt the harmonious narcissistic-dominance experiences. It will be even more difficult for him to deconstruct the structure of past experience. He will steal from experience behavioral elements and plot moments to fit them into the invented narrative motif. But before that, he will have to get rid of the baggage of experience and its complementary whole that soaks up experience like a sponge. He must fit the elements of experience into the invented pattern by transforming them into independent pattern that he can manipulate at will. They should establish an absolute connection with the invented pattern and banish the prevailing complementary residue.
The experimental procedure should save what it extracts from the deconstructed whole, just as much as it should stand for the contents that the subject pulls out of the sleeve of machinic imagination. Any shift that conflicts with these criteria will raise an alarm in the system of dispositional imagination. Schematism as such will be exposed to the same challenge, if the written and demonstrative language of normativity fails to harmonize it with the life of the inscenated objects (of objects staged in the imagination). Biological mechanisms do not remain short10. If the instinct does not do its job properly and fails to revitalize the organic structures in which it operates in time or as it should, the drive begins to show signs of life. The automatic physiological urge is awakened and does not ask the subject if he wants to be tortured. The improperly performed function of the instinct signals a deficiency. The revitalization patterns do not unfold and are not realized according to the primordial plan. The entire organism convulses and submits to the local center where the pain is strongest.
3.
The demonstration of superiority correlates with the third mode of primitive pride: the ego clashes with the world in order to emphasize its value and develop it. It is not an ego-volume that relies on the narcissistic-dominance representations like the previous ones, but itself, as we see, is a primordial archetypal representation. It is not pure egoic energy that spreads throughout the being and volumizes it. Its energy is intertwined with the concrete dispositional representations. The subject can exalt himself or be filled with himself without imagining a self-projection of dominance. But whenever he wants to show superiority, he does so in accordance with the immanent nature of dispositional representations. We have cited these facts to arrive at a significant conclusion. The display of superiority is an energetic representation par excellence, different from the other two ego-volumes and correlates of primitive pride. Experimental schematization acquires a similar independence. It becomes a pure psychic procedure with pure dynamics which the subject uses to penetrate the sphere of the subconscious and to extract experience, now that it has been overfilled with impulsive or drive forces. Experimental schematization has become a general procedure into the dynamic structures of which the subject has no insight. This gives the drive, the instinct, the urge, and even the reflexes the opportunity to free themselves from the automatism they represent. They submit to the archetypal representations and their objective dynamics. The archetypal representation manifests itself as it wishes. It thus gives the instinctive forces the opportunity to improve the mechanism and make it as self-referential and rational as possible. Physiological instinct never gains such an advantage. Instinct is not just an objective dynamic state of affairs, or pure automatic force. Biological mechanisms give the drive the task of supervising the operation of instinct. Cyclic need mechanizes instinct perfectly to rehabilitate the organs.
The subject has turned the drive and its agents into a cognitive tool after becoming familiar with the archetypal perspectives of the demonstration of superiority. Psychoid turmoil overwhelms and blurs the map of psychic processes. Psychoidity itself is a grandiose machinery that tramples everything before it and puts a hideous stamp on all internal processes. The creation of an image that is reflected in the old experience and builds on it meaningfully, turns into an impersonal psychoid event. Whatever consciousness is engaged in, the subject experiences it psychotically. Psychoid feelings are no longer local points that denote various aspects of themselves depending on the agents with which they have entered into a functional and dynamic relationship. From the outside, it seems that the drive forces have completely taken over the soul. And yet, although the subject is overwhelmed by the drive and psychoid experiences, he is almost completely in control of the uncontrolled excitement. The awareness of the archetypal perspectives of showing superiority is so pronounced that there is no doubt that the subject will harness the mental automatisms to obtain what he benefits from. The cognitive mechanisms that give rise to the feeling of demonstrated superiority have the power to tame automatic outbursts and show them their place.
The subject is psychoid, there is no word. And yet, lucidity almost invisibly shimmers behind the frenzied joy of the subject who exults because he gets what he wants. Madness provides sharpest sense of power and is tower from which power can best be anticipated. Despite the fact that the subject behaves insanely, he knows little about the most viscous processes and the forces that are hidden behind them. Instinct is at the disposal of systematic procedures. Need sharpens the drive to stimulate the process of extraction in genere. At least for the subject, extraction is identical with shaping, although it will begin to deepen the figurative experience after it has been extracted from the subconscious. The content of the experience will become figurative because the subject will deepen it; he will re-imagine it in accordance with its large meaningful potential that is observed in the basic impressions. The subject knows that experience has the power to illuminate situations of demonstrating superiority without going into details. However, the lower face-like images will not be able to develop convolutively and the system will show weakness if the subject does not develop their individual potential to the maximum. There are cases when the subject will create an objective representation of how the lower face-like image functions in a given situation, but will not show it in action. Such was the case with the adaptive lower face-like image. The subject has found an objective representation of his psychologistic mechanism, but he has not shown us how he uses the corpus delicti and how his attempt to be brave has failed because he has not played a good instructive role. The further the lower face-like image is from the perfect face-like image, the weaker the instructive initiatives it gives. But the demonstrative gap in the lower face-like image is part of the logic of convolutive progress. Periodic discontinuities allow the lower face-like images to connect convolutively.
The volution is a con-, not an e-, re-, in- or de- volution, because it allows the lower face-like image to create a dynamic hierarchy, despite the fact that their functional constitutions extremely differ from one another. The lower face-like images are extremely different, and yet they establish a series of rational relationships, because they complement each other meta-narratively. The periodic discontinuity represents the time required to form a lower face-like image whose ultimate difference will replace the ultimate difference of the lower face-like image before it. Ultimately, the greatest differences are neutralized because they all follow the path of the perfect face-like image. They are not stumbling blocks that lead the subject to new relatively functional forms by the force of some miraculous coincidence. But although their power is not so great, they interfere to force the subject to think of new psychological approaches. Every successful psychologistic approach forms and represents a new face-like image. Therefore, convolution has a teleological background, although at first glance it seems that everything happens randomly and in accordance with infinite time, which at a given point will produce as many necessary forms and in as perfect an order as is necessary. The theory of evolution also adheres to the same background. It also follows a pseudo-teleological path, which no matter how much it wants to deny it, it cannot:
“Darwinism reduces the origin of species to chance. Nevertheless, it marks adaptation and selection as purposeful and considers them to be directed towards a certain goal, even giving them a universal meaning. The organic world is something complete, concentrated in itself and directed towards a certain center, while at the same time showing increasing balance and harmony. Harmony, balance and their unity depend on the internal force that prepares their way, on the force of “natural selection”. Natural selection is a conservative factor. Another question is the nature of organic adaptation and whether it can be reduced to a game of random coincidences. The species does not have to come into existence after the unpredictable and unforeseen have occurred and after the characteristics of speciation have manifested. In any case, a sufficient reason for their occurrence exists in the organic structure itself. Unpredictability refers more to cognition than to the process. Even the theory of too rapid and jumpy mutations assumes that this fire actualizes and realizes the hidden, but innate possibilities of the species or genus. Therefore, mutations do not violate the integrity and purpose of the organic type. The boundaries of well-narrowed taxonomic groups remain uncrossed.”11
Mechanisms of archetypal representation do not follow the logic of convoluted development. They can occur in any order and their differences do not have to be adapted to a pure teleological vision. The extraction of a reminiscent representation of demonstrating superiority12 is built into the process of creating the perfect face-like image. And yet, the subject gets wind at its back by the fact that it has two formative and mutually complementary procedures on its side. This gives him the right to establish an even tighter control over the drive forces in order to realize the instinctive need. Of course, the more the subject empathizes with his own psychologistic states, the more the drive forces will thicken and flare up. Despite this, intense cognition will hold their reins firmly.
Demonstration of superiority is a pillar of one of the lower face-like images that gradually and surely establish the perfect face-like image. Therefore, the subject completely focuses the drive forces13 on it. The archetypal representation, i.e. the deepened experience of the past, should coincide with the pure archetypal ideal, i.e. the need, and elevate it. If the subject feels how the need is fulfilling its challenges, his consciousness will be overwhelmed by the drive for supremacy. Consciousness will get drunk, so it will reveal through the behavior of the subject how much and in what way the driving forces influence it. It will stagger with pleasure, but all its attention will be cruelly riveted to the supreme object of interest which is – the dynamic realization of the need. In this psychoid state, it takes the subject little time to become aware of the reality of power. He is completely absorbed by its energies, yet he circles blindly around its concept and does not recognize it. Most likely, the impulsive manifestation of the energy of power places a veil over him, so that he cannot recognize it as such, but feels it that much.
The subject will suddenly extract the experience, i.e. the fertile concrete image. This operation contradicts the function of instinct. Instinct ceases to be a homeostatic powerhouse. It cannot distribute to the center the products of the functions that are inherent in various internal structures. Sudden-extraction-of-experience abolishes the productive interpenetration that helps the ideal to gradually emerge from the underground. Instinct will distribute the experience14 as a pre-constructed whole, i.e. as a whole that is reproduced for the needs of the subject. Once the experience is constituted and revealed, instinct begins to cyclically perform its unique function. He will bring the experience back to consciousness, again and again, on behalf of the subject and his needs, to facilitate the process of deepening. Once instinct brings the experience to the forefront of consciousness, intuition steps in. It “shields” the segments that need to be meaningfully deepened. Then hands them over to the mind and imagination to process them.
The subject structures abstractly the need to demonstrate superiority. But this is not enough to free oneself from the feeling that one is cyclically and chaotically reproducing purely translucent contents. The psychic energies grounded in the drive also have a structural expression, but they too drown in the whirlpool of relative circulation. However, the abstract advantages offered by this situation sharpen the drive and its agents. They are accused affects. They encourage productive psychic action. At the same time they are guilty because they prolong subjective experiences, or make the subject sequentially disgusted by psychic action and its temporary impasse. They do not bring to the surface fragmented inscenations (purposeful imagined contents) that the subject cannot put together any more than a ship sunk in a storm can. They act in an organized manner, yet they cannot reconcile the archetypal representation with the archetypal ideal. The archetypal ideal is a pure representation of a need that belongs to a certain class of actions. The subject handles it easily. But the archetypal representation must rise to an inscenation. This is where a problem arises. No matter how clearly the subject understands the central element of the archetypal representation and ideal, in this case demonstration of superiority is the element, he struggles to inscenate the abstract representation. For example, he knows the attributes intrinsic to the demonstration of superiority, he knows how they should be arranged, and yet the purposeful imaginary content is nowhere to be seen. The need is a kind of spirit. It encourages the subject to create a preparatory representation for the demonstration of superiority, which will introduce him into the world of narcissistic-dominance inscenations. As a consequence, the subject awakens aggressive moods within himself. In part, these moods are due to the brutal nature of the drive forces. They affect self-awareness so much that the subject begins to adopt their wild habits and begins to behave impatiently and maliciously. These feelings are symbolic, because the subject directs aggression and its accompanying conditions towards the problem; towards the demonstration of superiority that resists and does not turn into an urgent inscenation15. The soul of the relatively excited subject is not possessed only by these morbid factors. Drive, aggression and their agents strain the subject. But the subject has at his disposal: a) an experimental pattern that allows him to approach the censored experience creatively; b) a general pattern that will emphasize that the experience has turned into a lower face-like image; and c) an abstract structure of demonstrating superiority that will become the core of the synoptic reminiscence. The subject not only “builds the tension from temporarily assembled pieces of illusion”, but the pieces of illusion are favorable elements of the unpleasant process, which will bring him victory instead of defeat16.
- Jaspers K, Opšta psihopatologija, Prosveta, Beograd, 1990, s. 150. ↩︎
- Sartr Ž.P, Kritika dijalektićkog uma I, Nolit, Beograd, 1983, 160 s. ↩︎
- Let us never forget that at this stage of the subject’s existential challenges, we see the demonstration of superiority from two perspectives: from the perspective of the initial position and from the perspective of the dispositional attitude. ↩︎
- Need has the function of distributing and using. Demonstration of superiority functions by showing what is appropriate and what is not. ↩︎
- Every person, even when trying to imagine something new, seems to patch up old experience and glue it together arbitrarily, because everything new comes from a previously created association or has acquired awareness of the symbolic potentials of factual situations. ↩︎
- The subject has previously included self-consciousness in the intuitive process and has strengthened it through certain intuitive aspects and events. Therefore, the subject is no longer alien to this useful approach. ↩︎
- Protential is the goal that has begun to move towards itself. In this case, the protential movement may not be desired, or may be desired in various ways: secretly, publicly, unconsciously. ↩︎
- We represent need as a pattern because by pattern we mean both the staged (or inscenated) events and the normative instructions that have a pure intelligible, and in certain cases, linguistic form. ↩︎
- Jaffe, D. S. (1982). Aggression: Instinct, drive, behavior. Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 2(1), pp. 92. ↩︎
- Ibid. ↩︎
- Флоровски Г., Теологија историје, Царство и пустиња 2, Одбор за просвету у културу Епархије Браничевске, Пожаревац, 2016, с. 53. ↩︎
- If we say not that we derive, but that we create a reminiscent representation, we change the meaning and purpose of the process. To create reminiscences is to invent an experience from the past that does not exist, or an experience that exists but has been transformed and has ceased to radiate historical objectivity. ↩︎
- Psychoid states also fall into the category of drive forces. They are expressions of consciousness that has become mindless because it has been filled with drive energies. ↩︎
- It will be both an archetypal representation and a lower face-like image at the same time. ↩︎
- Memories that arise in all their historical originality are also inscenations. ↩︎
- Pekić B., Besnilo, Bigz, Beograd, 1985, s. 213. ↩︎
Leave a comment